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Introduction
Notwithstanding present political and security issues, the Iraqi people
are desirous of establishing a new system of government based on pluralis-
tic democracy and the rule of law.
Iraq consists of several civilizations, and its history dates back several
millennia.' Its legal tradition goes back to one of the world's oldest codifi-
cations, the Code of Hammurabi, promulgated some 3750 years ago.
2
Iraq, as it is known today, was unified in 1918 by the British Empire
after the defeat of the Turkish Ottoman Empire in World War I.3 Britain
1. See JEAN BOTTRO, MESOPOTAMIA: WRITING, REASONING, AND THE GODS 55-200
(Zainab Bahrani & Marc van de Mieroop trans., 1995); GEORGE Roux, ANCIENT IRAQ
66-84 (3d ed. 1993). The older civilizations that comprised what is now Iraq are the
Sumerians, who go back to 5000 BCE and whose capital Ur was Abraham's place of
birth; the Amorites, who founded the cities of Babylon and Akkad and whose empire
lasted from 1900 to 1600 BCE; the Hittites, from 1600 to 1100 BCE; the Assyrians, from
1200 to 612 BCE; and the Chaldeans, from 612 to 539 BCE. Id. at 66, 104, 179-94,
377-79 tbls. IV-VIII.
2. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 86-93
(1936).
3. DAVID FROMKIN, A PEACE To END ALL PEACE: THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 449-55 (2d ed. 1989). The region,
which comprises Iraq and which is generally described in note 4, has also been referred
to as "Iraq" throughout history. Some archeological remains going back before the Corn-
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administered Iraq as a League of Nations mandate from 1922 to 1932,
when Iraq became an independent state and was admitted to the League of
Nations. 4 The Hashemite monarchy, established by the British govern-
ment in 1922,5 was toppled by a bloody military coup in 1958.6 This coup
was followed by two Ba'athist military coups, in 1963 and in 1968.7 Dur-
ing the latter coup, Saddam Hussein was head of the security forces, and he
was later elevated to Vice President. 8 In 1979, he took over the presidency
after Ahmed Hassan AI-Bakr resigned. 9 (Al-Bakr later died under mysteri-
ous circumstances.) 10 Saddam's repressive Ba'athist regime was marked
by consistent brutality and violence against the Iraqi people,"I by a bloody
war of aggression against Iran in 1980, which lasted until August 1988,12
and by the occupation of Kuwait from August 1990 until February 1991,
mon Era refer to that region as "Iraq," as do records of the Muslim Abbasid period from
approximately 850 to 1250 CE. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAM 18
(1988); see also generally ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES (2d ed. 2003).
4. The area known today as Iraq was ruled by the Persian Empire from 539 to 331
BCE; the Greeks and Macedonians from 331 to 170 BCE; the Parthians from 170 BCE to
224 CE; the Sassanians from 224 to 651 CE; the Arab Muslims from 652 to 1257; the
Turkish Ottoman Empire from 1301 to 1918; and the British Empire from 1918 to 1922.
Roux, supra note 1, at 406-22 tbls. VIII-XI (Persian, Hellenistic, Parthian, Sassanian);
FROMKIN, supra note 3, at 33, 426, 558-67 (Ottoman, British). During World War I,
Britain relied on Emir Sherif Hussein of Hejaz to fight against the Turkish Ottoman
Empire forces in the Arabian Gulf, Palestine, and what is now Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.
FROMKIN, supra note 3, at 174, 218-28. Hussein had two sons, Abdullah and Feisal. Id.
at 113. Feisal became famous for having fought on the British side at the instigation of
Thomas Edward Lawrence, popularly known as "Lawrence of Arabia." Id. at 497-99.
Feisal was made King of Syria in 1920, but due to arrangements between the British and
the French, on the French control of these areas he was made King of the newly consti-
tuted Iraq in 1921. Id. at 437-40, 442, 446, 499-500, 508. The League of Nations
established a protectorate over Iraq in 1922 and gave its administration to the British
Empire. Id. at 508-10. In 1932, the League of Nations admitted the Kingdom of Iraq
into its ranks of independent states. CHARLES TRIPP, A HISTORY OF IRAQ 75 (2000).
5. FROMKIN, supra note 3, at 500-64.
6. MICHAEL EPPEL, IRAQ FROM MONARCHY TO TYRANNY: FROM THE HASHEMITES TO THE
RISE OF SADDAM 147-52 (2004).
7. Id. at 204-08, 241.
8. Id. at 242, 244.
9. Between 1968 and 1979, Saddam Hussein was Iraq's strongman vice president.
For a description of Saddam's criminal activities, see EPPEL, supra note 6, at 241-65;
CON COUGHLIN, SADDAM: KING OF TERROR 23-175 (2002); and TRIPP, supra note 4, at
193-279.
10. TRIPP, supra note 4, at 254.
11. See EPPEL, supra note 6, at 241-65; COUGHLIN, supra note 9, 23-275. Human
Rights Watch reports on human rights abuses in Iraq are available online at http://hrw.
org/doc/?t=Mideast.pub&c=lraq&document-limit=20,20 (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
12. See generally STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE, THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: CHAOS IN A VACUUM
(1992) (examining Iraq's objectives and its decision to go to war with Iran); T.M.C. ASSER
INSTITUTE, THE GULF WAR OF 1980-88: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PER-
SPECTIVE (Ige F. Dekker & Harry H.G. Post eds., 1992) (discussing Iran-Iraq border
conflicts, the legal implications of the war, criminal responsibility, and the Islamic con-
ception of international law); W. THOM WORKMAN, THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE IRAN-IRAQ
WAR (Ige F. Dekker & H.G. Post eds., 1994) (focusing on the social origins and founda-
tions of the war).
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when a coalition led by the United States 13 drove Iraqi forces from Kuwait
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 678.14 Thereafter, the Shi'a in
the South, at the urging of the United States, rebelled against the Saddam
regime and were ruthlessly crushed. 15 The Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan (in the
northern part of the country) engaged in a struggle against Saddam's
regime and were also the object of ruthless repression between 1988 and
1991.16 A unilateral U.S.-UK-imposed no-fly zone over Iraqi Kurdistan
brought that region relief from attacks by Saddam's forces and de facto
autonomy from the Baghdad-based Ba'ath government. 1
7
The Ba'ath regime is estimated to have killed more than 500,000 Iraqi
citizens from 1968 to 2003.18 No one knows what the actual numbers are,
13. For a description of the First Gulf War, see generally NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF, IT
DOESN'T TAKE A HERO: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GENERAL H. NoRmAN SCHWARZKOPF
291-491 (1992).
14. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 27-28, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
678 (1990).
15. See Human Rights Watch, Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its
Aftermath, at http://hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm (June 1, 1992).
16. See generally TRIPP, supra note 4, at 243-48, 253-59 (discussing Kurdish resis-
tance and suppression).
17. The no-fly zone was imposed in April 1991 with the United States, the UK, and
France relying on UN Security Council Resolution 687. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th
Sess., 2982d mtg. at 31-32, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991); S.C. Res. 699, U.N. SCOR,
46th Sess., 2994th mtg. at 18-19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/699 (1991). Since Iraq's indepen-
dence in 1932, the Kurds have called for self-rule in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraq: Kurdish
Autonomy, Library of Congress Country Studies, at http://cweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+iq0076) (last updated May 1988) [hereinafter Iraq
Kurdish Autonomy]. The Kurds were first colonized by the Persians, then by the Turkish
Ottoman Empire, and when Britain defeated Turkey in World War I, it included what is
now Iraqi Kurdistan in that new country. FROMKIN, supra note 3, at 503. Kurds in neigh-
boring Turkey constitute almost twenty percent of that country's contemporary popula-
tion. Turkey: Society, Library of Congress Country Studies, at http://cweb2.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID TmrOO06) (last updated Jan. 1995). They are
also a minority in Syria. Syria: Kurds, Library of Congress Country Studies, at http://
lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+sy0036) (Apr. 1987). The
Kurds, who are Muslim, have their own language, culture, and traditions. They are not
ethnically Arab (of Semitic origin), and have always maintained their claim to
nationhood in all three countries, which led to alternating periods of struggle and
repression by the governments of Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. Iraq: Kurds, Library of Con-
gress Country Studies, at http://cweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field
(DOCID+iq0032) (last updated May 1988). In 1970, an Autonomy Agreement was
negotiated between the Ba'ath regime and Kurdish representatives, establishing an
Autonomous Region consisting of the three Kurdish governorates and other adjacent
districts determined by census to contain a Kurdish majority. Iraq: Kurdish Autonomy,
supra. The Autonomous Region was governed by an Executive Council and Legislative
Assembly. Id. However, genuine self-rule never really existed, and the Ba'ath Party
maintained strict control over the Region. Id. For example, any local enactments or
administrative decisions that were deemed contrary to the "constitution, laws, or regula-
tions" of the central government were countermanded. Id.
18. Estimates for the Anfal Campaign alone are 182,000, and estimates of bodies
buried in mass graves are between 300,000 and 500,000. See U.S. Department of State,
Fact Sheet: Past Repression and Atrocities by Saddam Hussein's Regime, at http://www.
state.gov/s/wci/fs/19352.htm (Apr. 4, 2003) for compilation of statistics regarding
human rights violations of the former Ba'ath regime.
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as no international or national investigation has ever documented sum-
mary executions and disappearances at the hands of the regime.
At first, these crimes consisted of assassinations of Ba'ath party mem-
bers who were not supportive of the then-strongman General Bakr and who
were skeptical of Saddam, then deemed an overly ambitious upstart even
among Ba'athists. 19 Then, in the early 1970s, there were highly publicized
executions of prominent religious leaders who opposed the regime.
20
Their killings were done in a manner designed to send a terror-inspiring
message to the rest of the population.21 By the mid- to late 1970s, wide-
spread and systematic disappearances, extrajudicial executions, torture,
arbitrary arrests, and detentions took place in blatant ways. 22
These practices remained the regime's hallmark for almost thirty-five
years. Many of the disappeared and executed were subsequently discov-
ered in unmarked mass graves.23 Among the better-known facts are the
killing of some 8000 Kurds of the Barzani clan in 1983;24 the brutal repres-
sive campaign carried out against the Kurds in 1987 to 1988, known as the
Anfal Campaign, which resulted in an estimated 182,000 deaths; 25 the gas-
sing-to-death of some 4000 to 5000 Kurds in Halabja; the forceful displace-
ment of Kurds in the Kirkuk region; and the forceful removal of an
estimated 140,000 Shi'a from the Marshland region, on the Iranian bor-
der.26 Notwithstanding the dreadful catalogue of crimes committed by
this repressive regime and countless brazen abuses of power by Saddam,
his sons, and his relatives, the international community tolerated the situa-
tion, and major powers maintained economic and financial ties to the
regime.
Another aspect of the regime's malfeasance is the squandering of the
country's assets on the development of weapons of mass destruction
("WMDs") and the embezzlement of public funds by Saddam and his sons
and relatives. 27
19. See TRIPP, supra note 4, at 194-99.
20. EPPEL, supra note 6, at 253; TRIPP, supra note 4, at 202-03.
21. TIpP, supra note 4, at 216-23.
22. Id.
23. See supra notes 17, 18.
24. TIPP, supra note 4, at 243. Barzani supported Iran during Iraq's invasion of that
country. Id. at 229.
25. See generally Human Rights Watch & Physicians, Iraqi Kurdistan: The Destruc-
tion of Koreme During the Anfal Campaign, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/
iraqkor/ (Jan. 1993); Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign
Against the Kurds, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ (July 1993).
26. See Human Rights Watch, The Iraqi Government Assault on the Marsh Arabs, at
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/marcharabsl.pdf (Jan. 2003).
27. The tip of the iceberg has been exposed in the ongoing UN investigation of the
oil-for-food program from which millions of dollars were illegally siphoned off. See
Interim Report, Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food
Programme, at http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/InterimReportFeb2005.pdf (Feb. 3,
2005); Second Interim Report, Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations
Oil-for-Food Programme, at http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/InterimReportMar
2005.pdf (March 29, 2005); see also infra note 55; Susan Sachs & Judith Miller, Sad-
dam's Oil-Food Fraud: "UN Let Him Do It," INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Aug. 13, 2004, at
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It is also noteworthy that the regime's two aggressive wars, the
Iraq-Iran War (1980 to 1988) and the Gulf War (1990 to 1991), led to the
death of what is estimated to be more than one million Iraqis. 28 Further,
the UN sanctions are estimated to have caused the deaths of 500,000 chil-
dren and older and gravely ill persons. 29 Admittedly, the international
1. For UN responses to the oil-for-food program criticism, see UN News Centre, Oil for
Food Inquiry, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocuslD=97
&Body=Oil-for-Food&Bodylinquiry (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
The program was administered by a committee operating under the Security Council,
not under the Secretary General's control. Yet, much of the media's contemporary criti-
cism is unfairly directed against the Secretary General. See, e.g., Norm Coleman, Kofi
Annan Must Go, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2004, at A1O (calling for UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan's resignation).
28. Although precise numbers are unavailable, the media and other sources, official
and unofficial, have reported that one million casualties resulted from the eight-year
Iraq-Iran war. See Edward T. Pound & Jennifer Jack, Special Report: The Iraq Connection,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 22, 2004, at 46; Death Tolls for Major Wars and Atroci-
ties of the Twentieth Century, at http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm#Iran-
Iraq (last updated July 2004) (estimating that approximately 300,000 to 400,000 Iraqis
and 600,000 to 700,000 Iranians perished during the Iran-Iraq War). Other estimates
place the death toll at 1.5 million. See Interview by Dan Rather with Saddam Hussein on
CBS News, 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, July 1, 2004), video streaming and
transcript available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/26/60II/main542151.
shtm (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
After the Gulf War, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency's approximated the death toll
at around 100,000 Iraqi casualties. Patrick E. Tyler, Iraq's War Toll Estimated by U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1991, at A5. However, it is difficult to obtain estimates for this war
due to the number of unidentified bodies that were either never recovered or were
thrown into mass graves by coalition forces. Comptons has stated that 150,000 Iraqi
soldiers were killed, and the World Political Almanac gives the same figure but includes
civilian deaths. See Death Tolls for Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century,
at http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm#ran-Iraq (citing Comptons and World
Political Almanac) (last updated July 2004).
29. See Barbara Crossette, Iraq Sanctions Kill Children, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1995, at
A9. In 1999, the UN estimated that one million Iraqis died due to the UN sanctions
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 661. Id. The twelve-year embargo was finally
lifted on May 22, 2003, when the Security Council adopted Resolution 1483. S.C. Res.
1483, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003).
The following Security Council Resolutions address the UN-imposed Iraq sanction
regime: S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990);
S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990); S.C.
Res. 666, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2939th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/666 (1990); S.C. Res.
669, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2942d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/669 (1990); S.C. Res. 670,
U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2943d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/670 (1990); S.C. Res. 687, U.N.
SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991); S.C. Res. 700, U.N. SCOR,
46th Sess., 2994th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/700 (1991); S.C. Res. 706, U.N. SCOR, 46th
Sess., 3004th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/706 (1991); S.C. Res. 712, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess.,
3008th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/712 (1991); S.C. Res. 986, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess.,
3519th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (1995); S.C. Res. 1051, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess.,
3644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1051 (1996); S.C. Res. 1115 U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess.,
3792d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1115 (1997); S.C. Res. 1129, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess.,
3817th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1129 (1997); S.C. Res. 1134 U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess.,
3826th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1134 (1997); S.C. Res. 1137 U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess.,
3831st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1137 (1997); S.C. Res. 1143, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess.,
3840th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1143 (1997); S.C. Res. 1153, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess.,
3855th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1153 (1998); S.C. Res. 1158, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess.,
3865th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1158 (1998); S.C. Res. 1175, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess.,
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community deserves blame for maintaining sanctions that had such a neg-
ative impact on the civilian population, but it was also the Saddam regime
that made decisions on allocating resources that produced these results.
This terrible tragedy will not be accounted for.
In a perverse way, Saddam's regime will escape responsibility for
aggression against its two neighboring states and the resulting casualties
suffered by his people because, after World War II, the major powers did
not declare aggression an international crime. 30
Regrettably, the March 2003 invasion by coalition forces, 31 the inter-
nal violence in Iraq since the occupation, 32 the Abu Ghraib tortures by U.S.
3893d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1175 (1998); S.C. Res. 1210, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess.,
3946th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1210 (1998); S.C. Res. 1242, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess.,
4008th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1242 (1999); S.C. Res. 1266, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess.,
4050th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1266 (1999); S.C. Res. 1281, U.N. SCOR 54th Sess.,
4079th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1281 (1999); S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess.,
4084th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (1999); S.C. Res. 1293, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess.,
4123d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1293 (2000); S.C. Res. 1302, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess.,
4152d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1302 (2000); S.C. Res. 1330, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess.,
4241st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1330 (2000); S.C. Res. 1352, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess.,
4324th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1352 (2001); S.C. Res. 1360, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess.,
4344th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1360 (2001); S.C. Res. 1382, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess.,
4431st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1382 (2001); S.C. Res. 1409, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess.,
4531st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1409 (2002); S.C. Res. 1443, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess.,
4650th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1443 (2002); S.C. Res. 1447, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess.,
4656th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1447 (2002); S.C. Res. 1454, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess.,
4683d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1454 (2002); S.C. Res. 1472, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess.,
4732d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1472 (2003); S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR 58th Sess.,
4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003).
For a discussion of the legality of these UN sanctions, see W. Michael Reisman &
Douglas L. Stevick, The Applicability of International Law Standards to United Nations
Economic Sanctions Programmes, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 86 (1998) (concluding that the Coun-
cil has failed to give adequate weight to international law and recommending legal prin-
ciples for mandatory economic sanctions programs); and Paul Conlon, Legal Problems at
the Centre of the United Nations Sanctions, 65 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 73 (1996) (discussing the
legal relationships of the UN Committees and the problems that arise between them).
Another estimate that Iraqis and the rest of the Arab world compare to the regime's
violations is the estimated 100,000 Iraqis killed by Coalition forces between March 2003
and September 2004. See Les Roberts et al., Mortality Before and After the 2003 Invasion
of Iraq: Cluster Sample Survey, THE LANCET, 364, 1857-64 (2004). The relevance of these
comparisons is that opponents of accountability for the Saddam regime raise these esti-
mates to show that the United States is also blameworthy and that it does not come forth
with "clean hands" when it condemns this regime.
30. Since the International Military Tribunal ("IMT") and International Military Tri-
bunal for the Far East ("IMTFE"), there has been no international consensus on "aggres-
sion" as an international crime. The 1974 General Assembly resolution on defining
aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/
9631 (1974), was never relied upon by the Security Council. See M. Cherif Bassiouni &
Benjamin B. Ferencz, The Crime Against Peace, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES
167, 184-85 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d rev. ed. 1999). The International Criminal
Court ("ICC") is still unable to agree on a definition of aggression. See M. CHERIF BAS-
SIOUNI, 1 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2005); MAURO
POLITI & GIUSEPPE NESI, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRES-
SION 81-84, 94 (2004).
31. See A Nation at War: On the Battlefield, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, at B2.
32. See Edward Wong et al., The Conflict in Iraq: Insurgents; Rebels Attack in Central
Iraq and the North, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2004, at Al.
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forces,33 and the Battle of Fallujah 3 4 have overshadowed the Iraqi and Arab
peoples' concerns for post-conflict justice against the Saddam regime.
Moreover, the need for political stability in this transitional stage of Iraq's
history may induce the new Iraqi government to make post-conflict justice
a low priority. If that were to be the case, it would be a regrettable missed
opportunity that will join a long series of post-World War II conflicts 35
where impunity has prevailed. 3 6
Furthermore, the flaws of the Iraq Special Tribunal ("IST" or "Tribu-
nal") discussed herein should not overshadow the imperative of prosecut-
ing Saddam Hussein and the senior leaders of his regime. The pursuit of
the best should not be the enemy of the good.
1. The Goals of Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq 3 7
Given the widespread and systematic nature of the political violence
committed by Saddam Hussein and his repressive Ba'ath regime for some
thirty-five years, the country's future requires a thoughtful national reflec-
tion on past abuses and an assessment of post-conflict justice needs. Iraq's
reconstruction and future democratic and rule-of-law-based society can
benefit from the government's 38 ability to openly engage itself and the peo-
ple of Iraq with the principles and strategies of post-conflict justice. 3 9 This
33. See citations infra note 147.
34. See Jackie Spinner & Karl Vick, U.S. and Iraqi Troops Push into Fallujah, WASH.
POST, Nov. 9, 2004, at Al.
35. Since World War 11, there have been more than 250 conflicts, and estimates of
the resulting casualties range from 70 million to 170 million. See M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other Serious Viola-
tions of Human Rights, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 3, 6 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002);
Jennifer Balint, An Empirical Study of Conflict, Conflict Victimization and Legal Redress, 14
NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES 101 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988).
36. Balint, supra note 35; Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, U.N. SCOR,
59th Sess., 5052d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (2004); Independent Study of Best Prac-
tices, Including Recommendations, To Assist States in Strengthening Their Domestic Capac-
ity To Combat All Aspects of Impunity, by Diane Orentlicher, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on
Human Rights, 60th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/88 (2004);
Final Report of Louis Joinet, Special Rapporteur of the Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. SCOR Commission on Human Rights,
49th Sess., Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 (1997).
37. For post-conflict justice goals, see POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 35; M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U. CoLo. L. REV. 409
(2000); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Justice in the World of Realpolitik, 12 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 213 (2000). For accountability standards, see Int'l Human Rights Law
Inst., Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice (forthcoming 2005).
38. UN-sponsored elections took place in Iraq on January 30, 2005, pursuant to S.C.
Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4844th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (2003). Dexter
Filkins, The Iraqi Elections: Election; Defying Threats, Millions of Iraqis Flock to Polls, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, at Al.
39. See, e.g., POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 35; NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, IMPUNITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1995); STEVEN R. RATNER &
JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY (2d ed. 2001); 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil Kritz ed., 1995); Diane Orentlicher,
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includes how the nation responds to the systematic violations of the previ-
ous repressive regime, how it deals with the regime's victims, and how it
transforms yesterday's tragedies into lessons for tomorrow that will
enhance future deterrence and prevention.
Experiences in various parts of the world since World War II confirm
that post-conflict justice in Iraq should not be ignored, and that its goals
should include the following:
1. Enhancing social reconciliation and avoiding individual acts of
vengeance;
2. Restoring an independent judiciary to Iraq and strengthening the
sustainability of a modern legal system in Iraq;
3. Sustaining the democratic future, territorial integrity, and stability
of Iraq, and supporting the establishment of a new democratic gov-
ernment based on the principles of the rule of law;
4. Creating a precedent in the Arab world for holding officials respon-
sible for systematic repression and abuse and contributing to the
worldwide experience of enforcing international criminal justice
through domestic legal processes, to which international prosecu-
tions are complementary; 40
5. Prosecuting Saddam Hussein and the senior leaders of the Ba'ath
regime before a specialized tribunal for violations of international
humanitarian law, gross violations of international human rights
law (including for crimes committed in the Iraq-Iran War of 1980
to 1988, in the Iraq-Kuwait War of 1990 to 1991, during the occu-
pation of Kuwait, in the regime's internal conflict waged against the
Kurdish independence movement, and during the suppression of
the Shi'a), and for crimes committed by the regime against the Iraqi
people in violation of international law and domestic criminal law.
Retributive justice in these cases is necessary to reinforce future
deterrence and prevention. To accomplish other goals, these prose-
cutions must have legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of Iraqis
and Arabs, and they must be conducted fairly and effectively.
6. Prosecuting less prominent perpetrators of war crimes and torture
before one or more chambers of Iraq's criminal courts to avoid
impunity for certain perpetrators;4 1
7. Providing victims of these regime crimes with reparation and other
redress remedies. 4 2 It has been recognized in the Draft Basic Prin-
Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100
YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
40. For more on complementarity, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 15-18 (2003).
41. It is possible to specialize some of the criminal courts' chambers to hear these
cases.
42. See Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuses of
Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, Annex, at 214, U.N. Doc.
A/40/53 (1985); Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of: Independence of the
Judiciary, Administration of Justice, Impunity: The Right to Restitution, Compensation and
Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
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ciples and Guidelines on the Right to Restitution, Compensation
and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms that "in honouring the victims' right to
benefit from remedies and reparation, the international community
keeps faith and human solidarity with victims, survivors and future
human generations, and reaffirms the international legal principles
of accountability, justice and the rule of law."4 3 Victim compensa-
tion should also provide popular support for prosecutions and
become the basis for an oral history recordation and a historic com-
mission described below.
8. Establishing an objective historical record of past political vio-
lence 44 in order to educate future generations about such crimes
and, generally, to inform such future generations of the perils of
undemocratic governance that commit gross violations of funda-
mental human rights.45 The sequel to such a historical recordation
should be the development of public educational programs at all
levels to strengthen the capacity of civil society.
Four post-conflict justice mechanisms should be used to achieve these
goals: prosecution of Saddam Hussein and senior leaders of his regime
before a specialized tribunal, prosecution of lesser offenders before one or
more specialized chambers of the Iraqi criminal courts, a victim compensa-
tion scheme, and a historic commission. These mechanisms must be made
part of an Iraqi process that enjoys national and international legitimacy
and that would also have broad Iraqi popular support.
Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. M. Cherif Bassiouni, submitted in accordance
with Commission Resolution 1999/33, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 56th
Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 11(d), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62 (2000) (including, in the
Annex, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law); The Right
to Restitution, Compensation, and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, E.S.C. Res. 2002/44, Commission on Human Rights,
58th Sess., 51st mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/200 (2002); The Right to Restitution, Com-
pensation, and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, E.S.C. Res. 2003/34, Commission on Human Rights, 58th Sess., 50th
mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/L.1l/Add.4 (2003). The latest revision will be submitted
to the Commission on Human Rights at its sixy-first session in March or April 2005. See
Civil and Political Rights, The Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Note by the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2005/59 (2004). For commentary on these draft guidelines, see Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 157,
160-65 (2004); and ILARIA BOTTIGLIERO, REDRESS FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 167-91 (2004).
43. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Vic-
tims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, U.N. ESCOR,
Commission on Human Rights, 56th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 11(d), Annex, at 5, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62 (2000).
44. The term "historic commission" is used here instead of "truth commission,"
because the former has a known connotation in Arabic, while the latter sounds alien to
the Arab culture.
45. See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF TRUTH
COMMISSIONS 29-30 (2002).
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The first of these post-conflict justice mechanisms, namely, the prose-
cution of Saddam Hussein and senior leaders of his regime before a special-
ized tribunal, will be faced with the criticism that they are only focused on
a few members of a defeated regime, namely, Saddam Hussein and some of
his senior subordinates.4 6 In the Arab world and elsewhere, these prosecu-
tions will be perceived as victors' vengeance or unfair because they are
selective. However, it should be said that selective justice, imperfect as it is,
does no injustice to those who deserve prosecution. In light of the wide-
spread atrocities committed by the Ba'ath regime, no one can argue that the
persons considered for prosecution do not deserve to face justice. None-
theless, every effort should be made to enhance the legitimacy, credibility,
and fair outcomes of their prosecutions. 4 7
46. See Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Briefing on Media Availability
(June 18, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr
20030618-secdef0282.html). It is likely that only eleven to fifteen (out of forty-three or
more) high-level detainees in U.S. custody will be prosecuted. Id. Others may receive
leniency in exchange for their trial testimony against Saddam and others. Id. Origi-
nally, the famous deck of cards printed by the United States before the March 2003
invasion of Iraq, with Saddam Hussein as the ace of spades, had fifty-five prospective
indictees. James Risen, April 27-May 3; Playing 55 Pickup in Iraq: The Game's One Third
Over, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2003. That number was, however, reduced after some of the
prospective indictees died and others, such as Tariq Aziz, who cooperated with U.S.
officials in identifying Saddam Hussein after his arrest and detention, were offered plea
bargains. See John Burns, Top Saddam Aides Face Trials in Spring, INT'L HERALD TRIB.
(Paris), Feb. 10, 2005, at 4.
Negotiated pleas, which are not part of the Iraqi criminal justice system, or, for that
matter, of most inquisitorial systems, is also a troublesome aspect of the IST. Its pur-
pose is mostly to make the case against Saddam and some of his most senior regime
associates. However, the judgment as to which prospective defendant falls in the cate-
gory of a defendant with a more favorable outcome (a guilty pleader who cooperated)
and one who does not is purely opportunistic. It has nothing to do with justice, and
raises serious questions about impartiality, and perhaps even about partial impunity,
for those who will benefit from leniency only because they cooperated with the accusers.
See Mirjan Damaska, Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts, 2 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 1018 (2004); see also Francoise Tulkens, Negotiated Justice, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 673 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & John Spencer eds., 2004). For a justice-ori-
ented perspective, see N.A. Combs, Copping the Plea to Genocide, 151 U. PENN L. REv. 4
(2002). For a truth-oriented perspective, see Mirjan Damaska, Truth in Adjudication, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 289 (1998); and Thomas Weigend, Is the Criminal Process About Truth?, 26
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 157 (2003).
47. The most damaging argument will be the immunity given by the CPA Order 17 to
the coalition forces. Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, MNF-Iraq, Certain
Missions and Personnel in Iraq, CPA Order 17, (June 27, 2004), available at http://www.
iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17-Status-of Coalition-Revwith_
Annex A.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005). (The CPA website will remain operational until
June 30, 2005. However, CPA Orders and Regulations are also available online at the
International Humanitarian Law Institute website, http://www.ihlresearch.org/iraq/
legal.php?PHPSESSID=B077b8429a762acfd2da65aba77415f4.) It should be noted that
the word "order" was consistently translated into Arabic as "decree" in CPA publications.
Ironically, though the United States originally resented the label "occupying power," it
nonetheless issued orders in the same way as it did during the post-World War II occu-
pation of Germany and Japan. In Germany, these orders were issued by the Allied Con-
trol Council, while in Japan they were issued by the Supreme Allied Commander. See
Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, Nov. 14, 1944, 5 U.S.T. 2062, 236
U.N.T.S. 359; U.S. Dep't. of State, Pub. No. 2671, Occupation ofJapan 8-9 (U.S. Dep't of
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II. The Evolution of Thought on Post-Conflict Justice: 1991 to 2004
Prior to addressing the issues involved in the prosecution of Saddam
and his regime leaders, it is useful to examine the evolution of the post-
conflict justice debate that took place from 1991 to 200448 to provide the
reader with a background on the major events leading to the formation of
the IST, 4 9 which is discussed in detail below. What follows is a brief chro-
nology of events concerning post-conflict justice proposals and ideas that
took place over more than a decade.5 0
A. Post-Gulf War: 1991 to 2001
After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, its exiled government in Saudi
Arabia, some other governments, and some nongovernmental organiza-
tions ("NGOs") called for the prosecution of war crimes arising out of the
occupation of Kuwait. Some NGOs also called for the prosecution of the
Ba'ath regime leadership for crimes committed in Iraq and for war crimes
prosecution for violations of international humanitarian law during the
Iraq-Iran War of 1980 to 1988.5 1 In January 1991, a Saudi law firm in
Riyadh floated an idea whose origin was assumed to be a U.S. government
source.5 2 The proposal was for an Arab League initiative to establish an
Arab war crimes tribunal for Iraq. However, the idea never percolated to
the Arab League's political echelons because it met with lack of interest in
Arab governments.5 3 This was followed by a suggestion, also believed to be
State Far Eastern Series 17, 1946). In Iraq, the equivalent were called Coalition Provi-
sional Authority Orders.
48. It should be noted that the post-conflict justice debate was essentially a U.S.
debate. The international community did not exhibit much interest in it.
49. See THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.
org/human rights/Statute.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2005). The statute became effective
upon CPA Order 48 (Dec. 10, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regula-
tions/20031210 CPAORD 48 IST-andAppendixA.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
50. Much of what this Article describes is based on this writer's personal involve-
ment in the process or his direct knowledge of events. Some of these facts, however, are
not a matter of public record and cannot be documented. Much more than what is
known to this writer is sure to have occurred within the U.S. Government and elsewhere.
Consequently, what follows is not presented as a complete description of all endeavors
relating to Iraqi post-conflict justice.
51. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Justice for Iraq: A Human Rights Watch Policy
Paper, at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraq1217bg.htm (Dec. 2002) (calling for
the prosecution of Ba'ath party leadership for human rights violations).
52. In February 1991, a partner of this firm who requested anonymity contacted me
to solicit my views on these proposals and my advice on how to advance them.
53. This lack of interest may be due to Arab states' reluctance to establish a prece-
dent of calling Arab leaders to justice or to Arabs' popular resentment of the U.S. mili-
tary intervention in Iraq and of its support of Israel. Historically, regime change in Arab
states has been accompanied by summary executions or imprisonment of previous
regime leaders. Post-conflict justice has not been the practice, although after Gamal
Abdel-Nasser's death in Egypt and the assumption of the presidency by Anwar al-Sadat
in 1971, a number of former Nasser regime officials were put on trial for various atroci-
ties, including summary executions, torture, and other human rights abuses. Among
those defendants was Salah Nasr, a former head of the Mukhabarat (Egyptian intelli-
gence), who was convicted and subsequently served a few years in jail. Afterwards, Nasr
wrote his memoirs, and blamed Nasser for his actions. See generally SALA NASR,
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U.S.-inspired, that the Gulf Cooperation Council (which includes Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman)
sponsor a war crimes tribunal, but it is believed Saudi Arabia did not wel-
come the idea. 54 At that time, the George H. Bush Administration was not
willing to involve the UN in the process and was not desirous of pursuing it
unilaterally. The United States, however, started to amass a large volume
of documents and engaged in large-scale interrogation of Iraqi prisoners of
war in Saudi Arabia for use in future prosecutions. This data was scanned
and computerized by the Department of Defense ("DOD"), and it was
reportedly stored in Boulder, Colorado. 55
No progress was made for the next three years until the Clinton
Administration in 1994 undertook preliminary informal consultations
with Security Council members with a view to establishing a commission
to investigate the Iraqi regime's domestic crimes and war crimes against
Iran and Kuwait. The commission was to be modeled on the Security
Council's 1992 Commission of Experts to Investigate Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia.5 6 Certain NGOs infor-
mally proposed broadening the mandate of this proposed commission to
include the investigation of other crimes in the context of internal conflicts
and political violence committed by the Ba'ath regime since it took power
in 1968, including the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi armed forces
against Iraqi Kurds, as well as an array of violations committed against the
Kurds, the Shi'a, and other Iraqi citizens. Between 1995 and 1997, the
Clinton Administration continued its informal consultations at the UN
with Security Council members, but it met with opposition from other per-
manent members of the Security Council. 57 In the face of this opposition,
THIKRAYAT: AL-THAWRA, AL NAKSA, AL-MUKHABARAT [REMEMBRANCE: THE REvOLUTION, THE
DISASTER AND THE INTELLIGENCE] (1999) (Nasr's autobiography).
54. Similar to other Arab countries, Saudi Arabia's reluctance to endorse an Iraqi
war crimes tribunal may be explained by a historic lack of interest in international crim-
inal justice. For example, between 1992 and 1994, the Saudis did not contribute to the
Voluntary Trust Fund of the UN Security Council Commission of Experts for the For-
mer Yugoslavia. See Final Report of the U.N. Commission of Experts Pursuant to S.C.
Resolution 780 (1992), U.N SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, at 12, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674
(1994) (enumerating the countries which contributed to the Voluntary Trust Fund).
55. The archives of data related to Iraqi prisoners of war ("POWs") were then called
the "Boulder files." Some of that material concerning the Ba'ath regime's Anfal Cam-
paign, supra note 18 and accompanying text, and the Marshland people's internal dis-
placement, supra note 26 and accompanying text, reportedly was provided to Human
Rights Watch, which published reports on these events. Most of these documents came
from the Kurdish north after the 1991 uprising. It is estimated that eighteen tons of
documents, including prison files, and video and audio recordings documenting indi-
vidual crimes and widespread abuses of fundamental human rights were collected.
Moreover, some documentation was obtained by the coalition forces in Kuwait. Some of
these documents have been digitized by the Iraq Foundation, whose President, Rend
Rahim, recently served as Iraq's Ambassador to the United States.
56. Such commissions have historically met with a tepid response in the Arab world.
See discussion supra note 54.
57. France, Russia, and the UK had significant economic ties with the Ba'ath regime.
In addition, Saddam had bestowed massive financial support on neighboring Arab gov-
ernments and senior individuals in certain countries including Jordan, Syria, Turkey,
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the Clinton Administration abandoned its efforts to establish such a
commission.5
8
B. The Bush Administration Period: 2001 to 2004
Shortly after 2001, the idea of a Security Council commission to inves-
tigate the Saddam regime's violations of international humanitarian law
and human rights law was floated within the George W. Bush Administra-
tion but was soon discarded. This may have been due to ideologically
based opposition to a UN-led effort, as well as the fact that it originally was
a Clinton Administration idea. However, in 2002, the Department of State
("DOS") included post-conflict justice issues, particularly the establish-
ment of an ad hoc tribunal, as a component of its "Future of Iraq" Pro-
ject.5 9 This year-long effort involved over one hundred Iraqi expatriates
from different parts of the world, including Iraqi-Americans and non-Iraqi
experts. 60 It had several working groups, one of which was a "Working
Palestine, and Egypt, as well as others, as documentation of Iraqi oil vouchers later indi-
cated. See Perry Beacon, Jr., A Deepening U.N. Scandal, TIME (London), Nov. 29, 2004, at
16; Bill Gertz, Saddam Paid Off French Leaders: $1.78 Billion in Oil-Food Funds Went To
Buy Influence at the U.N., WASH. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2004, at A14. China was also reluctant to
see the Security Council become more involved with the business of regime violations
investigations.
58. Secretary Albright was, however, interested in pursuing the option of a Security
Council Commission. Ambassador David Scheffer, then the Department of State's
(DOS) Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes, under the direction of Secretary Albright,
was also involved in this process. He had played an important role with the Yugoslavia
Commission between 1992 and 1994, which I chaired, and he asked me whether I
would chair a similar commission for Iraq.
59. As an expert to the "Working Group on Transitional Justice" under the "Future of
Iraq" Project, I prepared a comprehensive post-conflict justice plan in January 2003. See
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Iraq Post-Conflict Justice: A Proposed Plan, available at http://
www.law.depaul.edu/institutes-centers/ihrli/_downloads/raq Proposal-04.pdf (last
revised Jan. 2, 2004, based on plan prepared Apr. 28, 2003). The plan was modified in
April 2003 after broad governmental and NGO consultations. Among those who
worked with me then and who continue to have a leading role in Iraq is Ambassador
Feisal Istrabadi, who is Deputy Permanent Representative of Iraq to the UN. Previously,
Istrabadi was an aide to General Council ("GC") member Dr. Adnan Pachachi, and, in
that capacity, he contributed to the drafting of the Transitional Administrative Law
("TAL"), which is the equivalent of a temporary constitution. For a discussion of the
TAL, see infra notes 121-137 and accompanying text. Ambassador Istrabadi has been a
Senior Fellow at IHRLI since 2002. Another member of the Working Group was Attor-
ney Sermid Al-Sarraf, who has been the IHRLI's Chief of Party in Iraq since October
2003 and who oversees the IHRLI's "Raising the Bar" Project in Iraq (a project designed
to restructure legal education in that country. International Human Rights Law Insti-
tute, Raising the Bar: Legal Education and Reform in Iraq, at http://www.law.depaul.
edu/institutes centers/ihrli/programs/rule.education.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
Mr. Al-Sarraf summarized the 700-page report of the "Working Group on Transitional
Justice," and the report was publicly released in New York on May 15, 2003. Salem
Chalabi was another member of that working group, and he prepared the statute of the
Iraqi Special Tribunal ("IST") on the basis of this writer's proposals. For a description of
some details of the "Future of Iraq" Project's, see David Rieff, Blueprint for a Mess, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, at 28; Eric Schmitt &Joel Brinkley, State Department Study Foresaw
Troubles Plaguing Postwar Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2003, at 1.
60. The coordinator of this project was Thomas Warrick, who was previously
Ambassador Scheffer's deputy in the Department of State ("DOS") War Crimes Bureau
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Group on Transitional Justice" consisting of forty-one Iraqi expatriate
jurists and a number of U.S. experts, 6 1 including this writer, who prepared
several options for a post-conflict justice plan.62
In March 2003, before the U.S.-led coalition forces attacked Baghdad
and amidst concerns that the Ba'ath regime would use WMDs, 63 the idea
of establishing an ad hoc international criminal tribunal by the Security
Council was again briefly considered.6 4 This idea was abandoned within
during the Clinton Administration. Mr. Warrick moved to the Iraq desk to work on
Iraqi regime prosecutions shortly before George W. Bush came into office. Mr. Warrick
served as my legal counsel when I was the Chairman of the UN Security Commission
Established Pursuant to Resolution 780 (1992).
61. As stated above, Salem Chalabi was a member of this working group. He is the
nephew of the former GC member Ahmed Chalabi, who was then known for being sup-
ported by the DOD's civilian leadership and who later fell out of grace with the U.S.
government. Salem relied on this writer's proposed plan to prepare the IST's Statute. He
subsequently became the IST's Administrator. See infra note 81. He was appointed to
that post by the GC on May 8, 2004, and was tasked with setting up the organization
and structure of the IST and with working on the selection and vetting of sitting judges,
investigative judges, and prosecutors. However, in August 2004, Zuhair Maliky, an
investigating judge of Iraq's Central Criminal Court, issued an arrest warrant for Ahmed
Chalabi on charges of counterfeiting currency, and an arrest warrant for Salem Chalabi
on suspicion of murder. See Rajiv Chandrasekaren & Carol D. Leonnig, Chalabi Back in
Iraq, Aide Says: Former US Client Charged with Counterfeiting Currency, WASH. POST, Aug.
12, 2004, at A19; Jim Krane, Politics Afoot in a Bid To Rush Saddam Trial, Ousted Tribunal
Director Says, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 24 2004; Jackie Spinner, Premier Warns Gunmen
in Najaf; Arrest Warrants Issued for Chalabi, Nephew, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2004, at Al. It
should be noted that the charges of August 8, 2004, against Ahmed and Salem Chalabi
were subsequently reported to have been dropped. Salem Chalabi, who fled to London,
resigned his post but is likely to return soon to Iraq. Politics notwithstanding, Salem
Chalabi was committed to post-conflict justice in Iraq, and his efforts in that respect
should be acknowledged. InJanuary 2005, however, in the latest bizarre twist of events,
the Iraqi government made it known that it was going to arrest Ahmed Chalabi and hand
him over to Interpol, which has had an outstanding arrest warrant against him since
1992 for an in absentia criminal conviction in Jordan for embezzlement of funds when
he was in charge of Petra Bank. See Chandrasekaren & Leonnig, supra. At the time of
his conviction in 1992 by a Jordanian criminal court, Ahmed Chalabi escaped to
England. In addition to a twenty-two-year sentence of hard labor, Chalabi's sentence
also included an order for restitution of $230 million. Chalabi's status as a wanted
criminal in Jordan is well-known, yet he remains a free man and claims that the
Jordanian conviction was the product of a political setup. See Jane Mayer, The Manipula-
tor: Ahmed Chalabi Pushed a Tainted Case for War. Can He Survive the Occupation?, THE
NEw YORKER, June 7, 2004, at 58. Most recently, Ahmed Chalabi filed a lawsuit against
the Jordanian government in U.S. federal court based on his 1992 conviction for embez-
zlement and other crimes. See Chandrasekaren & Leonnig, supra. At the time of this
writing, he had just been elected as a member of the new Iraqi legislative body in the
January 30, 2005 elections as part of the Shi'a list.
62. See Bassiouni, supra note 59.
63. This was probably based on a faulty interpretation of a speech made in Arabic by
the Ba'athist Minister of Information, Mohammed Saeed A1-Sahhaf, who made public
statements days before the attack on Baghdad, some reported on CNN, that Iraqi forces
would use "unconventional" means against the United States. What he probably meant
by "unconventional" was the guerrilla warfare tactics that some Iraqis employed after the
fall of Baghdad. For an in-depth analysis of the war, see JOHN KEEGAN, THE IRAQ WAR
(2004).
64. At the time that the ad hoc criminal tribunal was being considered, Congress-
man Mark Kirk (R., Ill.), the ranking Republican member of the House Appropriations
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days, however, when concerns relating to the Iraqi forces' use of WMDs did
not materialize, and Baghdad fell with few U.S. casualties.65
After the U.S.-led coalition forces took control of Iraq, it became
increasingly clear that some form of tribunal would have to be established
to address the Ba'ath regime's violations of international humanitarian law,
international human rights law, and Iraqi law. The following three alterna-
tives were considered by the Bush Administration, the UN, and the NGO
community, which are incidentally the same as those proposed by this
writer in the context of the Future of Iraq Project mentioned above: (1) an
international tribunal established by the Security Council similar to the ad
hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda; 6 6 (2) a mixed international and national tribunal similar to the
one established in Sierra Leone,6 7 and (3) a national Iraqi tribunal with
some international support. The last option was favored by the Bush
Administration and this writer, while the NGO community favored one of
the first two. 68 However, efforts within U.S. government relating to the
establishment of the tribunal were put on the back burner in April after the
DOD began apprehending a number of important leaders of the Ba'ath
regime. At that time, it was believed that the DOD was more interested in
obtaining intelligence from these individuals regarding a number of key
issues, including WMDs and the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein and his
two sons, Uday and Qusay,6 9 than in establishing a tribunal.7 0 However,
Committee, called this writer and asked him to prepare a statute and a draft Security
Council resolution to be forwarded to Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq John D. Negroponte.
65. William J. Broad, A Nation at War: Outlawed Weapons; Some Skeptics Say Arms
Hunt Is Fruitless, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2003, at B8; Jodi Wilgoren & Adam Nagourney, A
Nation at War: The Casualties; While Mourning Dead, Many Americans Say Level of Casu-
alties Is Acceptable, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2003, at BI.
66. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
67. See S.C. Res 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315
(2000); Jennifer L. Poole, Post-Conflict Justice in Sierra Leone, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE,
supra note 35, at 563.
68. At initial meetings NGOs expressed a preference for an internationally man-
dated institution. However, a "mixed" international and national tribunal, similar to the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, was viewed as the second-best option. See Letter from
Human Rights Watch to the U.S. Regarding the Creation of a Criminal Tribunal for Iraq
(Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/04/iraqtribuna041503
ltr.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2005). For further details of the Sierra Leone Special Tribu-
nal, see Poole, supra note 67, and JOHN R.W.D. JONES & STEVEN POWLES, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL PRACTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, THE EAST TIMOR SPECIAL PANEL FOR SERIOUS CRIMES,
WAR CRIMES PROSECUTIONS IN KOSOVO (3d ed. 2003).
69. They were killed by U.S. forces in a raid on their hideout in Mosul on July 22,
2003. See Neil MacFarquhar, Hussein's Two Sons Dead in Shootout, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2003, at Al.
70. During this time, Rumsfeld indicated that plea bargains with these leaders were
possible. See Rumsfeld Briefing, supra note 46. Saddam was captured by U.S. forces at
A1-Dawr, near Tikrit, on December 13, 2003. See Susan Sachs & Kirk Semple, Ex-
Leader, Found Hiding in Hole, Is Detained Without Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at Al.
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the Administration always intended to prosecute Saddam Hussein and the
leaders of his regime.
During April and June 2003, several NGOs, led by Human Rights
Watch and the Open Society Institute with informal participation by UN
representatives, met in New York to discuss the above-mentioned three
options.7 1 The preference of most of the experts who participated in these
meetings was for an ad hoc international criminal tribunal established by
the Security Council with jurisdiction over crimes committed during the
Iraq-Iran War of 1980 to 1988 and during the invasion and occupation of
Kuwait from 1990 to 1991 and over crimes committed against the Kurds,
the Shi'a, and other Iraqi citizens. The next option was for a mixed
national and international tribunal as was used in Sierra Leone.
7 2
The NGO community felt that the scope and severity of the crimes
committed by the Ba'ath regime required the creation of a specialized inter-
national tribunal and that the Iraqi judiciary did not have the capacity to
undertake complex prosecutions. In addition, it expressed concerns for
the ability of Iraqi judges to be fair and impartial. On the other hand, the
Bush Administration was opposed to the idea of an international tribunal
established by the Security Council, preferring instead a national Iraqi tri-
bunal that it could help fashion and influence. 73 This writer, who was
present at most of these meetings, favored the option of an Iraqi tribunal
based on Iraqi law with international support.
74
Between April and September 2003, the Bush Administration, while
still favoring an Iraqi tribunal, remained unsure of what specific course of
action to follow regarding post-conflict justice in Iraq and ignored the rec-
ommendations of the Department of State ("DOS") Future of Iraq Project's
"Working Group on Transitional Justice." 75 Though it was apparent that
an international tribunal would enjoy the greatest amount of international
legitimacy, the ability to establish such a tribunal through the Security
Council was doubtful, given the limited role the UN was afforded by the
United States in Iraq. Additionally, even if it were possible for the Security
Council to establish a tribunal, the experiences of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and International Crimi-
71. See OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE & THE UNITED NATIONS FOUNDATION, IRAQ IN TRANSI-
TION, POST-CONFLICT CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 85-87 (2004); Bassiouni, supra
note 59, at 48.
72. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
73. These ideas were discussed on June 11, 2003, at a White House meeting between
Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch ("HRW"), and Condoleezza
Rice, then National Security Adviser to the President. The U.S. Administration argued
that Security Council Resolution 1483, operative paragraph 8(i), empowered the CPA to
carry out investigations and engage in subsequent prosecutions. See S.C. Res. 1483,
U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003). Paragraph 8(i)
is ambiguous in referring to "encouraging international efforts to promote legal and
judicial reform." Id. Thus, the U.S. Administration employed a great deal of latitude in
relying on this paragraph to justify the establishment of an entirely new judicial
institution.
74. See Bassiouni, supra note 59.
75. See supra note 59.
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nal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") suggest that it would be costly and time-
consuming.7 6 Moreover, a tribunal under UN auspices would not impose
the death penalty for any of the convicted perpetrators, and the Iraqi peo-
ple would most likely oppose the elimination of this penalty, which has
always existed in its criminal laws.
7 7
The Administration's views were that (1) an Iraqi tribunal would allow
the people of Iraq to assume responsibility for trying high-ranking Iraqi
Ba'ath officials for past political violence committed against them; (2) such
a tribunal would provide a strong foundation for a system of government
based on the rule of law; and (3) while any tribunal is likely to deliver a
message regarding impunity, an Iraqi tribunal would send a particularly
powerful message to Arab and Muslim leaders and their people that indi-
viduals responsible for systematic repression are no longer guaranteed
impunity. These views were in harmony with the international commu-
nity's expectations of post-conflict justice, 78 the difference being in the
nature of the process. 79
In September 2003, the idea of an Iraqi national tribunal bolstered by
international support was being actively pursued by the DOD, the DOS,
and the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), and it was coordinated by the
National Security Council ("NSC"), but there was no comprehensive plan
for post-conflict justice in Iraq. Nor was there someone with high enough
authority to establish policy and coordinate justice issues-a problem
which still exists.80 The conclusion was to have the initiative come from
76. See U.N. General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts $3.16 Billion 2004-2005
Budget as It Concludes Main Part of Fifty-Eighth Session, at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2003/ga10225.doc.htm (Dec. 12, 2003). For example, the budgets for the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") in 2004 to 2005 alone were $298.23 mil-
lion and $235.32 million respectively. Id. Cumulatively the ICTY and ICTR have cost
over $1 billion to date. Id. Both the ICTY and ICTR have been criticized for their cost
and the slow pace of the trials. See International Crisis Group, International Criminal
Justice for Rwanda: Justice Delayed, at http://www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?id=1649&I
-I (June 7, 2001). For a review of the ICTY and ICTR's judicial work and jurisprudence
see Megan Kaszubinski, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 459-85; Roman Boed, The International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda, in POsT-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 487-98. For an
analysis of the ad hoc tribunal's jurisprudence, see generally 1-4 ANNOTATED LEADING
CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Andre Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 1999); JOHN R.W.D. JONES, THE
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND
RwANDA (2d ed. 2000).
77. The death penalty has long been an accepted part of the Iraqi criminal law sys-
tem. It is a penalty that the majority of Iraqis favor for Saddam and for the senior perpe-
trators of his regime.
78. See authorities cited supra note 42.
79. This writer supports this view but differs with the Administration as to the
heavy footprints of U.S. government on the process.
80. This was still a period where lack of clarity existed within the Administration as
to the channels of authority on this subject. In other words, no one in high authority
was leading this project. There was also infighting between the DOS and the DOD,
which had ignored the DOS's "Future of Iraq" Project report. The CPA had a human
rights office headed by a capable and committed human rights advocate, Sandra Hodg-
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the Governing Counsel ("GC"), subject to the approval of the Coalition Pro-
visional Authorty ("CPA"). 8 '
C. Administering the IST
Between September and December 2003, the Statute of such a tribunal
was drafted and approved by the GC and the CPA. In accordance with the
established process, the GC approved a decree on December 9, 2003, estab-
lishing the IST, and on the same day, the CPA issued Order 48 (in Arabic,
"decree"), containing the Statute. On December 10, after CPA Administra-
tor Paul Bremer signed the order, it was published in the CPA's Official
Gazette. 82 Thus, it became an official institution of the occupying power.
8 3
Shortly after the IST was established, CPA Administrator Paul Bremer
announced that the United States would make $75 million available to
kinson, who is now at the National Security Agency ("NSA"), and her husband, David
Hodgkinson, an equally capable and committed CPA official responsible for post-con-
flict justice, who now serves at the DOS. Their authority, however, was limited, and in
fact, even Bremer's authority was limited on this subject. The National Security Council
("NSC") had another capable person responsible for justice issues, Clint Williamson,
but his authority was also limited. At the NSC, these issues involved Robert D. Blackwill,
then responsible for Iraq and Afghanistan, and Elliot Abrams, who was, and still is,
responsible for the Middle East. Neither are lawyers, and they seem to have given justice
issues a low priority. The NSC then decided to give the DOJ "lead agency" status over
Iraqi justice issues without regard to the fact that the DOJ, a domestic prosecutorial and
law enforcement agency, has no experience in such international justice issues and has
no expertise on the Iraqi legal system among its personnel. The DOS's Office of War
Crimes, headed by Ambassador Pierre-Richard Prosper, was not given the full role that
this office was originally set up to play in these matters. Ambassador Prosper was the
deputy head of that office under the Clinton Administration. He had previously served
in the DOJ and as a prosecutor at the ICTR. It may have been assumed that DOJ would
rely on the "Future of Iraq Working Group on Transitional Justice" and its experts,
which some in the White House and in the DOD opposed. The DOJ was apparently
sensitive to these currents, and it even sent an assessment team to Iraq consisting of
distinguished federal judges and prosecutors, none of whom knew the Iraqi legal system,
and it excluded U.S. experts of the "Working Group on Transitional Justice."
81. See THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL; Salem Chalabi: Judging Saddam,
11 MIDDLE E. Q. 325 (2004), available at http://www.meforum.org/article/664 (last vis-
ited Apr. 5, 2005). While he presided over the GC during September 2003, Salem
Chalabi was asked, with the approval of the CPA, by his uncle Ahmed Chalabi, to pre-
pare a draft statute for a special tribunal. Salem Chalabi relied on the draft statute that
this author prepared in March 2003, which was intended for a UN Security Council
mandated institution. In his attempts to use this draft statute for a national tribunal,
Salem Chalabi did not address a number of legal problems, which exacerbated the IST's
legitimacy and credibility problems. Among these legal problems was the fact that the
draft statute was modeled on an accusatorial-adversarial model, while Iraqi law is based
on an inquisitorial system, as discussed infra notes 331 to 337 and accompanying text.
As a result of these apparent flaws, a meeting was held at the International Institute of
Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences ("ISISC"), Siracusa, Italy, from December 7 to 12,
2003, to review the draft IST statute with CPA participation, and to address other issues.
However, the meeting was called off just days before it was scheduled to commence,
because, in the interim, the CPA had decided that the IST should be promulgated on
December 10, given that the capture of Saddam Hussein appeared imminent. For Salem
Chalabi's perceptions, see Salem Chalabi: Judging Saddam, supra.
82. See THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL.
83. For a discussion of the CPA's authority to establish the IST, see infra Part IV.B.
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it,84 and the DOJ dispatched a team of prosecutors and investigators to Iraq
in early March 2004 to gather the evidence to be used in prosecutions, to
organize the Tribunal, and to give on-the-job training to its judges and pros-
ecutors.8 5 While these U.S. prosecutors and investigators had a great deal
of experience and expertise to share with their Iraqi counterparts, they
knew little about the Iraqi legal system and the Iraqi legal culture. Further,
what the DOJ specialists had to offer in terms of experience with large-
scale criminal prosecutions did not fit well with a completely different legal
system and a substantially different legal culture. This led to their assump-
tion of a more directive, and necessarily more visible role. To some extent,
this was obvious in the choreographed arraignment of Saddam Hussein on
July 1, 2004. The Iraqi criminal justice system does not have that type of
arraignment procedure. Though the investigative judge acted with poise
and dignity, Saddam all but stole the show, adding to the perception that
this was an American-run operation. 86 Since Iraqi judges, investigative
judges, and prosecutors lack the experience to conduct these types of com-
plex criminal prosecutions, the vacuum drew U.S. specialists more into the
process, thus increasing the visibility of U.S. involvement.8 7
However, the judges, investigative judges, and prosecutors of the IST
have gradually taken ownership of the process, and have courageously
assumed their responsibilities.8 8 As the judges, investigative judges, prose-
cutors, investigators, and staff of the IST gained more confidence, the pro-
cess gradually became more Iraqi, and the role of the Regime Crimes
Liaison Office ("RCLO") became more supportive. Thus, as time goes on,
84. See CPA Transcripts, Bremer Affirms: Iraq Turns the Page, Apr. 23, 2004, available
at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/transcripts/20040423-page-turn.html (last visited Apr.
5, 2005).
85. See Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, U.S. Team Is Sent To Develop Case in Hussein
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at 1.
86. While all courts have the potential to be undermined or challenged by particu-
larly pugnacious and obstreperous defendants, as is currently the case in the ICTY
Milosevic Trial, see Keith B. Richburg, At Tribunal, Milosevic Blames NATO: Yugoslav Ex-
Leader Opens Defense, Mostly Ignores Charges, WAsH. Posr, Feb. 15, 2002, at At, a lack of
legal clarity existed in Saddam's "arraignment." This disconnect pertained to whether
the procedure performed was ad hoc and whether the magistrates were chosen by the
United States. The proceedings were choreographed as an American hearing where an
investigative judge read an indictment and asked the defendant to plead guilty or not
guilty, and was thus more American than Iraqi. There is no such procedure in the Iraqi
criminal justice system. The investigative judge, sitting behind a table facing Saddam,
was obviously uncomfortable. On the table where he sat facing Saddam Hussein was a
copy of the 1971 Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure, which does not provide for such an
American-style arraignment procedure. The investigative judge asked Saddam to enter a
plea, something unknown in the Iraqi system, and Saddam, who has a law degree, real-
ized this. Saddam then retorted that he was still a head of state under Iraqi law and that
the investigative judge had no legal right or basis to question him. See John F. Burns,
Defiant Hussein Rebukes Iraqi Court for Trying Him: Tells Judge He Is Still Lawful President,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2004, at Al.
87. Additional capacity is needed at all levels of the Iraqi judicial system. However,
that should not be done in a way that leaves heavy U.S. footprints.
88. Having gotten to know the IST judges, investigative judges, and prosecutors, I
can attest to their commitment to justice. Still, they can benefit from more expertise, as
they freely acknowledge.
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it is inappropriate to refer to the IST as an American creature dominated by
the U.S. government. In fact, since June 28, 2004, and the passage of sover-
eignty to the interim government, the U.S. mission in Iraq has assumed the
characteristics of a diplomatic mission that is very mindful of Iraq's
sovereignty.
The IST was originally administered by Salem Chalabi, s 9 who was
widely viewed as an American appointee with a domestic political agenda,
similar to that of his mentor-uncle, Ahmed Chalabi. 90 This had an adverse
effect on the perception of the IST in Iraqi and Arab public opinion. After
Salem Chalabi's indictment and departure to London 91 the United States
reclaimed the administration of the IST and relied on the DOJ's RCLO,
which assumed the responsibility for setting a prosecutorial strategy, train-
ing the judges and prosecutors, providing resources and personnel for
investigations, evidence gathering, and establishing the IST's infrastruc-
ture.9 2 This laudable task nevertheless exposed the extent of the U.S. role
in the process, and contributed to the widespread belief that the IST is a
U.S. enterprise.
In March 2004, the United States Institute of Peace ("USIP") and the
Institute for International Criminal Investigation, at the request of the
RCLO, cosponsored the first training conference in Amsterdam for Iraqi
IST judges and prosecutors.9 3 Then in September 2004, the DOJ and the
UK Foreign Office scheduled a training session for judges and prosecutors
in London, which included some IST judges and prosecutors. In February
2005, an extensive technical training seminar for the entire team of IST
judges, investigative judges, and prosecutors took place with the support of
the RCLO at the International Institute for Higher Studies in Criminal Sci-
ences in Siracusa, Italy.
D. The Overall Trial Strategy to Date
Since March 2004, the U.S.-led investigators have been gathering evi-
dence, which they have presented to the investigative judges of the IST.
The latter have also conducted their own investigations. The prosecutorial
strategy has been developed by the IST's investigative judges. In part to
fulfill the aims of the prosecutorial strategy and in part to fix some of the
89. See supra notes 61 and 81.
90. See John F. Burns & Dexter Filkins, Iraqis Battle over Control of Panel to Try
Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2004, at A13; see also supra notes 61 and 81.
91. See supra notes 61 and 81.
92. See U.S. Inst. of Peace, Special Report 122: Building the Iraqi Special Tribunal:
Lessons from Experiences in International Criminal Justice, at http://www.usip.org/
pubs/specialreports/sr122.htmI (June 2004).
93. The 1ST judges and prosecutors were formally appointed by the Iraqi Governing
Council (GC), but ostensibly selected by Salem Chalabi, who confirms that the GC
selected these officers only after consultation with a member of the new Judicial Coun-
cil, and after Chalabi and the GC had vetted the nominees. See Salem Chalabi: Judging
Saddam, supra note 81. The Judicial Council was reestablished with the Chief Justice as
its head by CPA Order Number 35. See infra Part IV.D.1.
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Statute's flaws, the United States, with UK input,94 prepared a draft "Rules
of Procedure and Evidence." However, these proposed rules were essen-
tially redrafted by the IST in accordance with the 1971 Criminal Procedure
Law.95 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Iraqi legal system, like
almost all of the world's legal systems, does not recognize such court rules,
because the judges constitute a judicial authority and cannot, therefore,
make laws or rules, which are the province of the legislative authority. This
is a fundamental tenet of the Iraqi constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers, though under the Ba'ath regime, this principle was consistently
violated. 96
The IST's prosecution strategy could be to record the criminal history
of the regime from 1968 to 2003. Such a model would, in part, follow
what both the International Military Tribunal ("IMT")9 7 and the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal for the Far East ("IMTFE")9 8 prosecutors did, and
also what Israel did in the Eichmann case.99 However, the danger of such a
strategy is that it will further enable Saddam Hussein to rely on a "politi-
cal" defense, which could detract attention from the crimes committed by
the regime, turning the proceedings into a trial against the United States
and other states that had dealings with the regime during the period in
question. 10 0 It is quite likely that Saddam Hussein will deploy a similar
94. The UK has also been discreetly involved in this process through experts such as
retired Colonel Charles Garraway, CBE, BIICL, former member of UK Army Legal Ser-
vices, who was detached to the CPA. In September 2004 and February 2005, the UK
Foreign Office facilitated training seminars for IST personnel in London.
95. An unpublished copy of the draft Rules of Procedure and Evidence, completed in
January, 2005, is on file with the author.
96. The legislature's exclusive rulemaking aegis is reflected in all Iraqi Constitutions
(see infra notes 132 to 136), though during the Ba'ath regime, the Revolutionary Com-
mand Council, under Saddam's control, exercised all powers.
97. International Military Tribunal: Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment
of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
279 (Aug. 8, 1945) [hereinafter IMT Agreement].
98. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, 4
Bevans 20 (amended on Apr. 26, 1946) [hereinafter IMTFE Charter].
99. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Sup. Ct. Isr. 1962). For
the views of the attorney general who prosecuted Eichmann, see also GIDEON HAUSNER,
JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 322-51 (4th ed. 1966).
100. One likely goal of Saddam's prosecutors is to establish the "evil" character of
Saddam's regime, and thereby justify the coalition forces' March 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Ironically, Saddam may base his defense on the same contention, namely, that the prose-
cution's main purpose is to vindicate the United States' decision to invade Iraq and to
overturn Saddam's regime. The anticipated U.S. strategy may explain why the IST's tem-
poral jurisdiction starts in 1968 and lasts until 2003. Such a trial strategy is likely to be
similar to the one used in the Eichmann case in Jerusalem. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277.
However, that case demonstrated the difficulty of trying to fit historic events into the
trial of a single person. See generally STEPHAN LANDSMAN, CRIMES OF THE HOLOCAUST: THE
LAW CONFRONTS HARD CASES (2005) (analyzing various post-conflict judicial systems,
including the IMT, the Eichmann and Demanjuk trials in Israel, and the lmre Finta
prosecution in Canada). The broader the inquiry into historic events, the more likely it
will involve political factors, and that explains why Saddam and other members of his
senior leadership may attempt to characterize their trials as being motivated by politics
rather than by a quest for justice. Consequently, these trials may degenerate into politi-
cal diatribes between the prosecution and the defense, though more so on the side of the
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strategy as did Herman Goering before the IMT 10 1 and as Milosevic contin-
ues to do before the ICTY. 10 2 An alternative strategy, which is likely to be
defense, as was the case at the IMT for Hermann Goering, and as is now in part the case
before the ICTY for Slobodan Milosevic.
For Saddam and the senior leaders of his regime, the situation lends itself much more
to political considerations than was the case with Goering, Eichmann, and Milosevic,
perhaps due to the intimate American connection to the rise and, ironically, the fall of
Saddam's regime. See CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE 217-53 (2004).
Aspects of America's foreign policy in the Middle East since the end of the Cold War that
have become known may encourage Saddam to raise a defense based on the notion of tu
quoque, meaning "you too," in that America's actions contributed to the crime at hand,
even though that type of defense was rejected at the Nuremburg Trials, in the case of
Germany's Grand Admiral Doenitz. See EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE GERMANS:
AN ACCOUNT OF THE TWENTY-Two DEFENDANTS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBU-
NAL AT NUREMBERG 394-419 (1966); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Investi-
gations and Prosecutions: From Versailles to Rwanda, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
ENFORCEMENT 31-86 (M. Cherif. Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999); Otto Kranzbuehler,
Nuremburg: Eighteen Years Afterwards, 14 DEPAUL L. REv. 333 (1964). Although tu
quoque is not a recognized defense, it would allow Saddam to argue that he is being
charged by his accomplices, who are not themselves being held accountable.
Thus, for example, Saddam may argue that the United States acquiesced to his inva-
sion of Kuwait as part of an evolving plan to secure an American presence in the Middle
East oil belt. See JOHNSON, supra, at 225. Surely, even more troublesome would be argu-
ments raised by the defense with respect to the use of chemical weapons that Iraq used
during the Iran-Iraq War, whose manufacture was facilitated by materials provided by
the United States and other Western powers, including Britain. See Michael Dobbs, U.S.
Has Key Role in Iraq Buildup: Trade in Chemical Arms Allowed Despite Their Use on Irani-
ans, Kurds, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2002, at Al; (Scott) Report of the Inquiry into the
Export of Defense Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions
(H.C. 1995-96); Eugene Robinson, Spy Says British Knew of Iraqi Arms Plans; M15 Man
Testifies in Rare Breach of Secrecy, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1992, at A17. It has been
reported that between 1985 and 1988 biological agents were exported, under a U.S.
government license, to Iraqi government agencies, possibly including materials used in
March 1988 by Ba'athists in the gassing of the Kurdish village of Halabja, which resulted
in 5000 casualties. See Dobbs, supra; Philip Shenon, Threats and Responses: The Bioterror
Threat: Iraq Links Germs for Weapons to U.S. and France, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2003, at
A18. In fact, it has been argued that the link between Saddam's devices of chemical
warfare and the United States was so strong that the United States removed 8000 crucial
pages from the weapons dossier that it was required to disseminate to the Security
Council in December 2002. See James Cusick & Felicity Arbuthnot, U.S. Tore out 8000
Pages of Iraq Weapons Dossier, SUNDAY HERALD (Glasgow), Dec. 22, 2002, at 1.
What may also become contentious during Saddam's trial is the U.S. involvement in
the funding of his military program. Moreover, he targeted Iranians during the 1980s
using U.S. supplies, including military intelligence, technology, and munitions. JOHN-
SON, supra, at 221-25; Patrick Tyler, Officers Say U.S. Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of
Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, at Al. Also, the CIA has been no stranger to Iraq's
political machine. Id. Ironically, the United States is now driving the prosecution of a
figurehead it helped put in power, after having provided the Ba'athists with military and
economic support, first to crush Iraq's pro-Soviet regime in 1963 and subsequently to
train and ensure the ascendancy of Saddam as the head of Iraq security forces in 1968.
JOHNSON, supra, at 223-24.
101. See DAVIDSON, supra note 100, at 59-98; TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 319-50 (1992); 9 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 417-661 (1947).
102. Slobodan Milosevic clearly intended to pursue such a strategy, as illustrated by
his proposed list of witnesses, which included President Clinton, Prime Minister Blair,
and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the "Dayton Accords" of 1995 that
brought an end to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Ana Uzelac, Inst. for War
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followed, would be to focus on specific crimes without connecting the his-
toric dots. This would avoid some of the defense's more politically ori-
ented arguments. Even so, it will be difficult to control the proceedings
and almost impossible to disengage them from politics.
10 3
A more significant consideration affecting strategy is the limitation
imposed by the 1971 Criminal Procedure Law, Article 132, which does not
contemplate the type of complex litigation involving multiple victims that
presents itself in this context. 10 4 Iraqi criminal procedure is based on indi-
vidual cases presented by victims as complainants and investigated only by
an investigative judge. Moreover, Iraqi criminal law does not know con-
spiracy as a crime, though it is included in the IST Statute. Article 132
mentioned above requires the case of each victim to be brought separately,
with the possibility of joinder of three victims' complaints against the same
accused in one case. There is an exception to that limitation in paragraph
4 of Article 132 "permitting joinder of more complainants whenever it is a
single criminal act that produces multiple victims. This limitation does not
allow much room for the chief investigative judge to develop cases of com-
mand responsibility based on multiple victims who have suffered harm at
different places and times and at the hands of multiple perpetrators other
than the commanders to whom ultimate responsibility is sought to be
attributed.
Lastly, it should be noted that evidentiary requirements under Iraqi
law do not allow for much leeway in drawing inferences from the facts.
Direct evidentiary connections must be established. Thus, reliance on
what the United States knows as the "but for" test cannot be used in Iraqi
criminal proceedings. These and other evidentiary limitations, particu-
larly in view of the lack of specific written evidence containing explicit
orders by senior leaders, will make it difficult for the IST to rely on the
experiences of the ICTY and the ICTR in establishing a strategy for prose-
cuting senior leaders and executors and in proving these cases according to
Iraqi criminal law and evidentiary requirements. The remedy presently
relied upon, the IST's adoption of "Rules of Procedure and Evidence,"' 05
will have to withstand potential legal challenges in Court if they are
deemed of a legislative nature.
and Peace Reporting, Tribunal Update: Milosevic Planning "Political Show," at http://
www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/tri/tri-367-1-eng.txt (July 16, 2004).
103. In the inquisitorial system, the presiding judge at the trial has the discretion to
decide what questions suggested by the defense he wants to ask a given witness. How-
ever, there is no limit as to what the defense can present in writing, either as proposed
evidence or as submissions for the Court's consideration.
104. See QANUN USUL AL-MUHAKAMAT AL-JAZAIA [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF 1971],
Law No. 132 (Iraq).
105. See THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL.
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III. The Legal and Political Structure in Iraq from March 19, 2003 to
June 30, 2004
On March 19, 2003, a U.S.-led coalition invaded and occupied Iraq. 106
On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush announced the end of major
combat operations in Iraq, thus beginning the era of foreign military occu-
pation.10 7 After thirteen months of formal occupation, the United States
and the UK, who were the lead countries in the coalition forces, ended their
formal occupation on June 30, 2004, pursuant to Security Council Resolu-
tion 1483.108 This resolution reaffirmed the applicability of international
humanitarian law and its binding obligations on the occupying power
(referred to by the United States and UK as "the Authority" entrusted to
administer Iraq) until the establishment of an interim government. 10 9 The
process of transfer of sovereignty started on June 26, 2004, and was con-
cluded on June 30th. 1 10
Since March 2003, the United States and UK and other foreign forces
have been an occupying power. Security Council Resolution 1511111
affirms the coalition forces' obligations as an occupying power that arise
under international humanitarian law. 112 The occupying power, no mat-
ter what name it assumed, is unquestionably bound by the Geneva Con-
106. The invasion happened on the assumption that Iraq's long-time repressive
regime continued to produce or even stockpile WMDs and that it had thwarted attempts
of UN inspectors to verify compliance with prior UN resolutions concerning WMDs.
The United States Iraq Survey Group's search for WMDs recently ended in failure. See
Julian Borger and Jonathan Steele, U.S. Gives up Search for Saddam's WMD: Iraq Survey
Group Concludes Dictator Destroyed Weapons Years Before Invasion, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Jan. 13, 2005, at 14.
107. See George W. Bush, Speech at USS Lincoln (May 1, 2003) (transcript available
at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/05/01/bush.transcript/) (last visited Apr. 5, 2005);
Jordan J. Paust, ASIL Insights: The U.S. as Occupying Power over Portions of Iraq and
Relevant Responsibilities Under the Laws of War, Apr. 2003, at http://www.asil.org/
insights/insigh102.htm (Apr. 2003).
108. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483
(2003).
109. The interim government assumed power on June 28, 2004. It will remain in
existence until the three-member Presidency Council, elected by the new Iraqi parlia-
ment (elected on January 30, 2005), appoints a new prime minister and cabinet, subject
to confirmation by the parliament.
110. The occupying power formally transferred sovereignty to the Judicial Council on
June 26, 2004. The Judicial Council then transferred authority to the interim govern-
ment on June 28th, and on June 30th, the U.S. declared an end to its presence in Iraq as
an occupying power. However, the U.S. military has remained in Iraq, exercising de
facto control over the country's security, with the consent of the interim government.
Neither the United States nor any of the coalition forces have a status of forces agree-
ment with Iraq. The coalition forces are not under the control of the interim government
and act within the territory of Iraq with complete freedom of action and without
accountability to the interim government.
111. S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 38.
112. See Human Rights Watch, The War in Iraq and International Humanitarian Law,
at http://www.hrw.org/-Iraq/ihlfaqocupation.htm (May 16, 2003); Amnesty Interna-
tional, Iraq Responsibilities of the Occupying Powers, at http://web.amnesty.org/
library/index/eng.mode140892003 (Apr. 16, 2003); International Humanitarian Law
Institute, Military Occupation of Iraq: IHL and the Maintenance of Law and Order, at
http://www.ihlresearch.org/iraq/ (Apr. 14, 2003).
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ventions 1 13 and other sources of customary international humanitarian
law. 114 It should be noted, however, that Security Council Resolution
1511 implicitly recognizes that Iraqi sovereignty lies in the GC.
115
The CPA was created by the U.S. Government on June 16, 2003, as an
organization under the control of DOD to administer Iraq, in keeping with
UN Security Council Resolution 1483.116 The CPA, whose legal authority
was premised on international humanitarian law as the civilian administra-
tion of an occupying power, 11 7 was recognized by the Security Council in
Resolution 1483 as exercising this role. 118 Security Council Resolution
1511 reaffirmed this proposition." 9 In July 2003, the CPA appointed the
GC to serve as a transitional Iraqi governmental body subject to CPA's
approval of its orders, directives, and personnel appointments. 120 Conse-
quently, the GC was a subordinate local administrative body operating
under the authority of the occupying power.
Probably one of the GC's most influential tasks was the preparation of
the Transition of Administrative Law ("TAL"), 12 1 which is in the nature of a
transitional constitution to guide the governing of Iraq until legislative elec-
tions take place and a permanent constitution is adopted. The TAL was
approved by the GC on March 5, 2004,122 and published by the CPA on
March 8, 2004.123 Notwithstanding the TAL, however, the CPA's Adminis-
trator Paul Bremer reserved for himself a veto power over all GC decisions
and personnel appointments. 124 It could be said that because of this self-
declared veto power by the occupying power, the Security Council did not
113. See generally Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva
Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97 (2004).
114. For a compendium of information on the laws of armed conflict, see U.K. MINIS-
TRY OF DEF., THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2004); and A MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 2000).
115. See S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 38.
116. See CPA Reg. No. 1, May 16, 2003, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20030516 CPAREG 1_The CoalitionProvisionalAuthority-.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 13, 2005) (creating the CPA).
117. See U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., supra note 114, at 281-99. For an account of the
history of war and compliance with the laws of war, see generally GEOFFREY BEST, WAR
AND LAW SINCE 1945 (1994).
118. See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 108.
119. See S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 38.
120. See CPA Reg. No. 6, (July 13, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20030516_CPAREG. 6 The CoalitionProvisionalAuthority_.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 5, 2005) (creating the Governing Council of Iraq).
121. LAw OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
(Mar. 8 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/governmentt/TAL.html (last
visited Apr. 5, 2005) [hereinafter TALl.
122. NathanJ. Brown, Transitional Administrative Law, Commentary and Analysis, at
http://www.geocities.com/nathanbrownl/interimiraqiconstitution.html (June 11,
2004).
123. See supra note 109.
124. The TAL does not include a statement recognizing the CPA Administrator's veto
over decisions made by the Governing Council or decisions made pursuant to the TAL.
However, the TAL does not specifically exclude the veto that the CPA Administrator has
by virtue of the fact that he is the appointing authority of the Governing Council and
Vol. 38
2005 Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq
refer to the TAL in any of its resolutions. 125 However, a more likely expla-
nation has to do with another provision of the TAL that gives a de facto veto
power to the Kurds in respect to the legal status of Iraqi Kurdistan, which
raised concerns among both Shi'a and Sunni segments of Iraqi society.
On June 8, 2004, Security Council Resolution 1546126 endorsed a
plan for Iraq's transition to full sovereignty and for legislative elections. 12 7
It was on that basis that the CPA ended its tenure on June 30, 2004. This
was done under formal UN cover. The appointment of the interim govern-
ment, a president, two vice presidents, a prime minister, and cabinet
officers were based on consultations by the Special Representative of the
Secretary General ("SRSG"), with Iraqi political forces and the United
States and the UK as the principal occupying power. 128 The primary task
of this transitional national authority was to work with the postoccupation
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq ("UNAMI"), established pursu-
ant to Security Council Resolution 1500, and with the Special Representa-
tive to the Secretary General 12 9 to establish an Iraqi Independent Electoral
Commission, which oversaw the January 30, 2005 elections. These elec-
tions produced a Transitional National Assembly ("TNA"), whose term of
office is to last until the formation of an elected Iraqi government and the
adoption of a constitution, which is to be no later than December 31,
2005.130 During this transitional period, the TNA is to draft a new consti-
tution.13 1 Iraq's first constitution was the Monarchial Constitution of
1925.132 Provisional constitutions were adopted in 1958 (which elimi-
that all decisions of the Governing Council must be approved by the CPA. CPA Regula-
tion Number 1 states that all decisions have to be ratified by and reenacted by the CPA.
125. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483
(2003); S.C. Res. 1500, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4808th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1500
(2003); S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4844th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511
(2003); S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4987th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546
(2004).
126. S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4987th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546
(2004).
127. S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 126.
128. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Envoy Bowed to Pressure in Choosing Leaders, WASH.
POST, June 3, 2004, at A10.
129. Ashraf Jehangir Qazi of Pakistan was appointed UN Special Representative to
Iraq on July 22, 2004.
130. See TAL, supra note 121, at art. 2. Pursuant to the TAL, the TNA elected on
January 30, 2005 a president and two vice presidents, who then appointed a prime min-
ister, whose cabinet will be approved by the TNA. See id.
131. Whether the TAL will be a model is uncertain. Also uncertain is whether the
present governmental structure of the interim government will remain and, if so, what
changes may occur and how. For sources on Iraqi constitutional law, see generally
NABIL ABDEL RAHMAN HEIAW1, DUSTUR AL-IRAQ AL-MALAKY, AL-QANUN AL-ASAsI [CONSTITU-
TION OF ROYAL IRAQ: THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF 1925 AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATIONS
OF THE ROYAL ERA] (2003); NABIL ABDEL RAHMAN HEIAWI, DASATIR AL-IRAQ AL-JOMHORIA
[REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTIONS OF IRAQ] (2003).
132. AL-QANUN AL-AsASi AL-IRAQI [Constitution] (1925) (Iraq), available at http://
nahrain.com/d/doc/dtrl925a.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) (Arabic version) and at
http://www.mallat.com/iraq%20const%201925.htm (English version) .
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nated the monarchy), 13 3 1964,134 1968,135 1970,136 and the GC adopted
the TAL in March 2004.137
UN Security Council Resolution 1546, which sets the framework for
the transitional phase to a legislative body and a permanent constitu-
tion, 138 does not however address two essential issues:
1. The continued legal validity of CPA Orders published in English
and later in Arabic in "the Official Gazette of an occupying
power." 139 This lacunae leaves the interim government and the
TNA the prerogative of choosing whether to give continued legal
effect to all or some CPA Orders. 140 The TAL Annex provides that
133. AL-DUSTUR AL-Mo'AKAT [Provisional Constitution] (1958) (Iraq), available at
http://nahrain.com/d/doc/dtr1958.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) (Arabic version).
134. AL-DuSTUR AL-MO'AKAT [Provisional Constitution] (1964) (Iraq), available at
http://nahrain.com/d/doc/dtr1964.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) (Arabic version).
135. AL-DuSTUR AL-MO'AKAT [Provisional Constitution] (1968) (Iraq), available at
http://nahrain.com/d/doc/dtr1968.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) (Arabic version).
136. AL-DuSTUR AL-MO'AKAT [Provisional Constitution] (1970) (Iraq), available at
www.mallat.com/iraq%20const%201970.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) (English ver-
sion) [hereinafter 1970 Constitution]. There was also a 1990 draft constitution that was
never promulgated.
137. The TAL of 2004, supra note 121, does not have the status of an official
constitution.
138. The Security Council's failure to address the CPA's continued legal viability and
pass a status of forces agreement, see infra notes 139 to 142 and accompanying text,
occurred because the positions of the United States and United Kingdom differed from
those of the other Security Council members. See Sharon Otterman, Iraq: UN Resolu-
tion 1546, at www.cfr.org/background/background-iraq-1546.php (June 10, 2004).
139. Under the Provisional Constitution of 1970, see supra note 136, legislative power
by decree could be exercised by the Revolutionary Command Council, presided over by
Saddam Hussein. Such decrees were then published in the Official Gazette of Iraq,
which had only a limited circulation. Ironically, the CPA repeated this procedure. The
CPA's inspiration may have come from the post-World War 1I occupation of Germany,
when the four Allied Powers issued the Allied Control Council Orders. The most famous
of these was Control Council Order or Law Number 10, which established the Allies'
right to prosecute Germans in their respective zones of occupation on two different
grounds of the same crimes contained in the IMT, namely, "war crimes" and "crimes
against humanity." Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of
War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, art. 11(c),
reprinted in 1 BENJAMIN FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR
WORLD PEACE 492 (1975). For a discussion of the U.S. prosecutions, see TELFORD TAY-
LOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON NAzi WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NUMBER 10, at 6-8 (1997). There were also prosecutions by the
British, the French, and the USSR. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 40, at 140, 412-13; Bas-
siouni, supra note 100, at 41-48.
140. Article 26(c) of the TAL, supra note 121, states: "The laws, regulations, orders,
and directives issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority pursuant to its authority
under international law shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation
duly enacted and having the force of law." This provision is analogous to the situation
where laws issued by the government of a predecessor state also apply to the successor
state. For a discussion of the doctrine of state succession, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE 142-47 (4th ed. 2002); DANIEL
PATRICK O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967); 1 L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE 156-69 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955);
Mathew C.R. Craven, The Problem of State Succession and the Identity of States Under
International Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 142-62 (1998); Malcolm N. Shaw, State Succession
Revisited, 6 FIN. Y.B. INT'L L. 34 (1994). State succession could be relied upon on the
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the Interim Council of Ministers of the interim government can, by
unanimous vote and the approval of an interim president, issue
decrees with the force of law that will remain in effect until
rescinded or amended by future governments of Iraq. 1 4 1
2. The need to have status of forces agreements' 4 2 between the gov-
ernment of Iraq and those foreign governments whose military per-
sonnel are stationed there after June 30, 2004, when the
occupation formally ceased.
The failure of Resolution 1546 to address these two issues has an
impact on post-conflict justice in Iraq. First, it creates uncertainty as to
whether the IST can have continued legal validity at the end of the occupa-
tion and whether the government of Iraq after the election of the TNA
needs to reenact a law similar to CPA Order Number 48 of December 9,
2003, which established the IST.1 43 Second, it calls into question the con-
tinued legal validity of CPA Order Number 17 granting coalition forces
immunity in Iraq, 144 which is particularly important after evidence of vio-
lations of the Geneva Conventions 145 and the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment ("CAT") 116 by coali-
tion forces operating in Iraq was uncovered.14 7 While the U.S. administra-
assumption that the CPA was the de facto state successor of the Ba'ath regime, or based
on the fact that the CPA exercised national sovereignty as an occupying power pursuant
to the Geneva Conventions. See Geneva IV, infra note 145. For a further analysis of the
continued legal validity of the TAL, see Peter W. Galbraith, Iraq: The Bungled Transition,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 2004, at 70-74.
141. See TAL Annex, supra note 121.
142. For an example of a status of forces agreement, see Agreement Between the Par-
ties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, Apr. 4, 1949, 4
U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67 (entered into force Aug. 23, 1963) [hereinafter NATO Sta-
tus of Forces Agreement].
143. See THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPEcIAL TRIBUNAL.
144. See CPA Order No. 17. It should be noted that the Ba'ath regime adopted,
through the Revolutionary Command Council, a similar decree giving all of its members
complete immunity. This decree is unavailable to the author.
145. The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva I]; The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; The Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Ill]; The
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV]. For details of states party to the
Geneva Conventions, see ICRC Annual Report 2002: States Party to the Geneva Conven-
tions, at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/945D7163D51CAAD7C12
56D47004BOD5C/$File/icrc ar_02_MAPGECONVA4.pdPOpenElement (last visited
Apr. 4, 2005).
146. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter CAT]. CAT has been implemented in U.S. law at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340B.
147. See The "Taguba Report" on Treatment of Abu Ghraib Prisoners in Iraq, Article
15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, Mar. 2004, available at http://
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html (Apr. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Taguba
Report]; Major General George R. Fay, Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu
Cornell International Law Journal
tion maintains that such violations represent isolated incidents, evidence
continues to emerge that points to a wider policy of systematic abuse and
suggests that senior officials either approved or were deliberately indiffer-
ent to it. 14 8 In light of these violations, the continued legal validity of CPA
Order Number 17,149 which gives immunity to coalition forces, raises seri-
ous questions of legality.
The connection between CPA Order Number 17 and the IST is evident
in Article 1(b) of the IST, which limits jurisdiction to "Iraqi nationals or
residents of lraq."150 Thus, Article l(b) of the IST Statute (the "Statute")
gives effect to CPA Order Number 17. Of note, however, is that CPA Order
Number 17 does not specifically obligate the governments of the coalition
Ghraib: Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelli-
gence Brigade 6-33, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504
rpt.pdf (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Fay Report]; Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones,
Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib: Investigation of the Abu Ghraib
Prison and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade 34-176, available at http://news.findlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Jones Report]; Final
Report of the Independent Panel To Review DOD Detention Operations, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/dod/abughraibrpt.pdf (Aug. 2004) [hereinafter
Schlesinger Panel]; see also SEYMOUR HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11
TO ABU GHRAIB 1-72 (2004) (arguing that responsibility for official misconduct at the
Abu Ghraib prisons extends to high officials in the Bush Administration); American
Civil Liberties Union, Torture FOIA, at http://www.aclu.org/International/Interna-
tional.cfm?ID=13962&c=36 (last updated Mar. 25, 2005); Human Rights Watch, The
Road to Abu Ghraib, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usaO604/usaO604.pdf. (June
2004). Seven U.S. reservists from the 372nd Military Police Company were charged for
the abuses that occurred at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. On January 14, 2005, Spe-
cialist Charles Graner was the first one convicted by a U.S. military court, and the fol-
lowing day he was sentenced to ten years in a military prison. Kate Zernike, The Conflict
in Iraq: Abu Ghraib: Ringleader in Iraqi Prisoner Abuse Sentenced to 10 Years, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2005, at A12. As of January 2004, four other reservists have reached plea bar-
gain agreements with the prosecution, including: Staff Sergeant Ivan Frederick, Special-
ist Megan Ambuhl, Specialist Jeremy Sivits, and Specialist Armin Cruz. Sergeant Javal
Davis's trial is scheduled for February 2, 2004, and Specialist Sabrina Harmon's trial is
scheduled for March 2004. See Dexter Filkins, The Struggle for Iraq: The Court-Martial;
G.I. Pleads Guilty in Court-Martial for Iraqi Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at Al;
Richard Oppel, Guilty Plea by Sergeant in Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, at A10;
Zernike, supra. Yet, no high ranking military personnel or high-level civilian officials
have been implicated in the scandal.
Similar to the situation in Iraq, the treatment of detainees in Afghanistan has also
violated international legal obligations under the Geneva Conventions and CAT. See
Report of the Independent Expert of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of
Human Rights in Afghanistan, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Agenda Item 105(c), U.N. Doc. A/
59/370 (2004).
148. For the proposition that torture may have been ordered or condoned at high
levels, see Report of Independent Expert on the Commission on Human Rights on the
Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, supra note 147; HERSH, supra note 147, at
1-72; ACLU Report, supra note 147; Fay Report, supra note 147; Jones Report, supra
note 147; Schlesinger Panel, supra note 147; Taguba Report, supra note 147.
149. See CPA Order No. 17.
150. The IST's temporal jurisdiction lasts from July 17, 1968 through May 1, 2003.
See THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL arts. 1, 10.
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forces to prosecute those who are alleged to have committed war crimes.15 1
Had CPA Order Number 17 and Article 1(b) of the IST Statute clearly
stated the intention to provide coalition forces with jurisdictional immu-
nity before Iraqi courts, while providing for the obligation of Coalition
Forces governments to prosecute alleged offenders, the issue of selective
enforcement and disparity in accountability standards would not arise,
unless, of course, the coalition forces fail to carry out their legal obligations
to investigate and, where appropriate, to prosecute.
It should be noted that complementarity between national and inter-
national legal systems is recognized in Article 17 of the International Crim-
inal Court ("ICC") statute, which gives priority to the national criminal
jurisdictions of states parties that are willing and able to undertake prose-
cutions and does not call for the establishment of a jurisdictional regime
under such circumstances.1 5 2 The problem with CPA Order Number 17
and Article 1(b) of the IST Statute is that they appear to provide substantive
immunity from prosecution. 153 No such immunity is permissible under
international humanitarian law or other sources of international law with
regard to international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, torture, slavery, and slave-related practices.15 4 Multinational
forces in Iraq have been authorized pursuant to Security Council Resolu-
tions 1511 and 1546,155 and coalition forces could have been covered by
the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Person-
nel. i5 6 In any event, the immunity referred to in CPA Order Number 17
151. See CPA Order No. 17, at art. 2(3) (declaring that the members of the Coalition
forces shall be "subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their Sending States," but not
charging the sending states with any prosecutorial obligations).
152. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July
17, 1998, art. 17, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome
Statute]. In the event that a state party is "unable" or "unwilling" to prosecute, the ICC
may assert jurisdiction. For a comprehensive background of the creation of the ICC, see
generally THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. 1998). For a legislative history of the ICC, see generally BAS-
SIOUNI, supra note 30. On February 15, 2005, the Interim Government adopted a decree
on accession to the ICC, but before the instrument of accession could be deposited with
the United Nations, the "Interim Government" revoked it, presumably at the instigation
of the United States, which feared that the actions of its forces in Iraq could be referred
by the subsequent Iraqi government to the ICC.
153. Between 2002 and 2004, the United States adopted a similar strategy when it
obtained immunity from ICC jurisdiction for its forces serving in UN missions, or UN-
authorized missions, with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1422, S.C. Res.
1422, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002), and Security
Council Resolution 1487, S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4772d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1487 (2003). However, on June 23, 2004, in the face of increasing international
opposition, the United States withdrew its request for a renewal of Resolution 1487. See
BASSIOUNI, supra note 30.
154. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 40, at 109-36.
155. S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 38; S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 126; see TAL, supra note
121, at arts. 59(B)-(C) (recognizing the legal presence of multinational forces).
156. See Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec.
9, 1994, G.A. Res. 49/59, 49 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 49, at 299, U.N. Doc. A/49/49
(1994). UN personnel and associated personnel operate under the privileges and
immunities of the UN, pursuant to the Charter, and as negotiated between the UN and
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should be interpreted as granting immunity from Iraqi legal processes, but
not from the national jurisdiction of those countries contributing the per-
sonnel. Thus, it does not rmean substantive immunity for international
crimes, as this would be categorically contrary to international law.15 7
This problem can be solved by a status of forces agreement between the
coalition forces and the government of Iraq.156
IV. An Appraisal of the Iraq Special Tribunal
A. Introduction
Iraq's first major step on the path of post-conflict justice was the estab-
lishment of the IST with jurisdiction over Iraqi citizens for crimes of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other crimes under Iraqi
law as defined in Articles 11 to 14 of the Statute. 15 9 The Tribunal's juris-
diction extends to these crimes even if committed outside of Iraq, such as
in Iran and Kuwait. Article 10, however, refers to the Tribunal's jurisdic-
tion over Iraqi and non-Iraqi citizens, and this provision will have to be
interpreted in light of CPA Order Number 17, which gives coalition forces
immunity. 160
The IST was established pursuant to the Iraqi GC Decree of 9 Decem-
ber 2003, and the Statute, discussed below, was issued thereunder. 1 6 1
Like all other decisions taken by GC, it was subject to the CPA's official
enactment, and it became CPA Order Number 48 on December 9, 2003,
effective upon its signature by Paul Bremer, the CPA Administrator, on
December 10, 2003.162 The TAL confirmed CPA Order Number 48, but
the TAL was promulgated by the GC under the authority of the CPA and is
therefore an instrument developed by a subordinate body of the occupying
power. Nevertheless, the TAL was the expression of all political tendencies
in Iraq and should be given greater weight than GC decrees and CPA
orders.
The IST's legislative basis is the order of an occupying power, which,
as discussed below1 6 3 in Part IV.B, is questionable, particularly as to its
survival in the postoccupation era. Moreover, the continued control of this
process by the United States undermines its legitimacy and credibility in
the host state within which they operate. Under this agreement, jurisdiction vests pri-
marily in the personnel's state of nationality, much as in the status of forces agreements.
Nevertheless, even peacekeeping forces can be held responsible for international human-
itarian law violations. See GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOpS, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
OF PEACEKEEPERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1-24 (2004).
157. Thus, foreign personnel who violate international law would likely be barred
from defending their actions based on the principle of "no responsibility due to igno-
rance." See discussion infra note 308.
158. See NATO Status of Forces Agreement, supra note 142, for an example of such an
agreement.
159. See discussion infra Part IV.E.2-3.
160. Id. See also supra note 152.
161. See THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL.
162. Id.
163. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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the perception of the Iraqi and other Arab people.164 In addition, the IST's
jurisdictional exclusion of coalition forces during the same range of the
IST's temporal jurisdiction without a concomitant obligation for the coali-
tion forces to prosecute, adds to the perception of politicized justice. 165
It must be understood that Iraq is not post-World War II Germany or
Japan. It is not an enemy of the United States crushingly defeated after a
protracted war. Iraq is a country that was invaded without international
legitimacy 16 6 on the premise that it had WMDs likely to be used against
the United States. 167 The United States and other coalition partners who
were involved in the invasion of Iraq did not do so on the basis of the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, as was the case of NATO's interven-
tion in Kosovo in 1999.168 Even though the United States and the UK fre-
quently invoked the regime's past misdeeds, nothing in international law
justifies foreign military intervention for past violations of human rights or
other humanitarian laws. 16 9 The United States and the UK did not invoke
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention for ongoing violations by the
Ba'ath regime as the basis of their military action, which started in March,
2003. Paradoxically, throughout the entire period of the Ba'ath regime
(1968 to 2003), and during phases of its worst widespread and systematic
human rights violations (1970 to 1988), the United States never formally
advanced the likelihood of its reliance on the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention for military action in Iraq.
No norm or precedent exists in international law for an occupying
power, the legitimacy of which is in doubt, to establish an exceptional
national criminal tribunal. Yet, there is no doubt of the need for a special-
ized tribunal to prosecute Saddam and the regime's major offenders. More-
over, any criticism of the IST should not overshadow the need to have such
prosecutions.
164. Since its establishment, the IST has been essentially a U.S.-led enterprise,
though, as stated above, the Iraqi judges, investigative judges and prosecutors have taken
some ownership of the Tribunal, and their personal courage in agreeing to serve in such
capacities deserves recognition.
165. See supra notes 138 and 144 and accompanying text.
166. See S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441
(2002). This resolution did not authorize the use of "all necessary means," language
that is recognized as authorizing the use of force, but only referred to "serious conse-
quences," which is not synonymous with the authorization of the use of force. Further-
more, every Security Council member affirmed that the resolution did not provide for
the automatic resort to force. Id.
167. In his remarks to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003, U.S. Secretary of
State Colin Powell presented the U.S. case for attacking Iraq, based on its possession of
WMDs. See Press Release, The White House, President George W. Bush, Iraq: Denial
and Deception; Secretary Powell's Remarks at U.N. Security Council Meeting (Mar. 7,
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/print/ 2 0 03 03
07-10.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
168. For a discussion of that war, see generally TIM JUDAH-, Kosovo WAR AND REVENGE
(2000); WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR: BOSNIA, Kosovo AND THE FUTURE OF
COMBAT (2001).
169. Had the international community established a Security Council commission to
investigate these crimes, as discussed supra Part II.B. and accompanying footnotes, it
would have contributed some legitimacy to the military intervention of March 2003.
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The way to remedy criticism of the IST is for a legitimate national
legislative authority to repromulgate an amended law establishing a spe-
cialized (not special) criminal tribunal, in conformity with the Iraqi legal
system but on the basis of continuity of the IST. 170 If that were not the
case, all of the IST's work until now would be deemed null and void, dam-
aging the overall purposes of future prosecutions. Such a repromulgated,
amended law would also resolve the legal issues and problems contained in
the Statute. Moreover, as is customary in the legislative practice of most
Arab states, the repromulgated, amended law should be accompanied by
an explanatory memorandum (muthakkira tafsiriya) that describes the con-
tents of the law and reflects the legislative intent.1 7 1
More importantly, the repromulgated, amended law must follow a cer-
tain legal method to avoid incongruences presently contained in the Stat-
ute. For example, the Statute incorporates some of the measures enacted
by the Ba'ath regime, but not others. It recognizes the applicability of the
1970 Provisional Constitution in Article 14172 and the 1971 Criminal Pro-
cedure Law in Article 17,173 but it provides no explanation for this selectiv-
ity. Moreover, it commingles features of the adversary-accusatorial
American system with the Iraqi inquisitorial one. 174 Worse yet, it commin-
gles legal aspects of the Ba'ath regime whose protagonists are to be prose-
cuted and due process guarantee features of the American legal system.
Also troubling is that the Statute provides for judicial appointments made
170. Iraq has a legal system and laws that, between 1925 and 1958, were on par with
the legal systems of other Arab states and well in keeping with many legal systems of the
world. The modern Iraqi legal system was established after the adoption of the 1925
Constitution, supra note 132. The judiciary consisted of a three-tiered court system
modeled on the Egyptian and Syrian systems, which, in turn, were derived from the
French inquisitorial judicial system. The Court of Cassation acted as Iraq's court of last
resort for all cases, except for security cases. Crimes against the security of the state
were tried in Revolutionary Courts, which operated outside the formal Iraqi court sys-
tem. The Court of Cassation also adjudicated jurisdictional conflicts between lower
courts and assumed jurisdiction over crimes committed by high government officials.
The intermediate Court of Appeals decided issues of law and fact. There were seven
Circuit Courts of Appeals sitting throughout Iraq. Below these courts were a number of
district courts, which were divided into specialized chambers dealing with criminal,
civil, and domestic relations matters. See Iraq: The Judiciary. Library of Congress Stud-
ies, at http://countrystudies.us/iraq/74.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2005).
Under the 1925 Constitution, judicial independence was guaranteed. See 1925 Con-
stitution, supra note 132, at art. 71. However, subsequent to 1958, the military and
Ba'ath revolutions and coups tampered with that system by enacting special laws that
violated the independence of the judiciary and by establishing a number of special arbi-
trary courts. The Ba'ath regime also instituted a series of laws that placed the judiciary
under the direct control of the Minister of Justice, and thus effectively curtailed the inde-
pendence of the judiciary.
171. Such an explanatory memorandum would provide guidance to the judges and to
the parties, and enhances judicial uniformity in the application of the law.
172. THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL art. 14; see also 1970 Constitution,
supra note 136.
173. THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL art. 17; see also QANUN USUL AL-
MUHAKAMAT AL-JAZA'IA [IRAQI CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW] Law No. 23 of 1971 [hereinafter
Criminal Procedure Law].
174. See infra Part V.
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by the executive with a limited role for the Judicial Council. This is similar
to what the Ba'ath regime did.175 These and other incongruences of the
IST which are sought to be remedied are discussed below.
B. General Observations on the Legitimacy of the IST's Establishment
As stated above, the IST was established pursuant to CPA Order Num-
ber 48, which represented the occupying power. 176 It is a "special tribu-
nal" with jurisdiction over Iraqi nationals accused of committing genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and certain other crimes under Iraqi
law, 17 7 whether committed inside or outside Iraq, between July 17, 1968
and May 1, 2003, with the exception of coalition forces' actions, which, as
discussed above, are not included in the IST's jurisdiction under Article 1.
However, Article 10 of the Statute states that the Tribunal's jurisdiction
extends to non-Iraqis, while CPA Order Number 17 gives coalition forces
immunity. There is therefore an inconsistency between Articles 1 and 10 of
the Statute and CPA Order Number 17.
Since the IST is a special tribunal outside the established Iraqi legal
system, the question arises as to whether an occupying power has the legal
authority to create such a tribunal. However, it should be noted that the
TAL ratified the IST, and that the TAL is implicitly recognized in Security
Council Resolution 1511.178 Notwithstanding the TAL's confirmation of
the IST, there is some ambiguity as to whether the IST is established by the
CPA and the GC during a period of occupation, and it is necessary for the
transitional government to repromulgate the Statute by adopting an
amended law. The repromulgation of the Statute with amendments and an
explanatory memorandum will not only eliminate questions of legitimacy
and credibility but also cure some of the flaws contained in the Statute,
which are discussed below.
The United States is bound by the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949179 and the Hague Regulations of 1907,180 as well as subsequent
developments of customary international law.' 8 ' According to these
sources of applicable law, the United States is an occupying power, and it
cannot, inter alia, do the following: (1) change the functioning of the
175. See infra Part IV.E.1.
176. Geneva IV, supra note 145.
177. See infra Parts IV.E. 2-3.
178. S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 38.
179. Geneva IV, supra note 145, applies to the civilian population and the administra-
tion of occupied territories.
180. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague IV].
181. For support of the proposition that the United States is bound by customary
international law, see generally JORDAN PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATES (1996). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REv. 815 (1997) (arguing that the
United States is not so bound).
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administration of the occupied territory; 18 2 (2) change the existing legal
system;1 8 3 (3) alter the status of public officials and judges;18 4 (4) change
the penal legislation;' 8 5 (5) issue new penal provisions;' 8 6 (6) intern civil-
ian populations other than on the basis of prisoner of war;18 7 (7) change
the tribunals of the occupied territory; 188 (8) prosecute inhabitants for acts
committed before the occupation;18 9 or (9) enter into agreements with the
governing authority of the occupied territory or make agreements on
behalf of the occupied territory that "shall adversely affect the situation of
the protected persons, as defined by the present Convention, nor restrict
the rights which it confers upon them."190
An exception to the above is that the penal laws of the occupied terri-
tory may be repealed or suspended by the occupying power in cases where
they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of
the Geneva Conventions, 19 1 or if the laws introduced by the occupying
power are more favorable to the civilian population. Article 4 of Protocol I
confirms the above limitations on the occupying power.' 92 Although the
United States has not ratified Protocol I, this provision still applies because
it is deemed part of customary international law. 193 Accordingly, the
question arises as to whether the United States had the legal authority to
establish the IST. The answer depends on what aspect of the Statute is
addressed. With respect to the procedures and guarantees of the rights of
the defense, the IST is more favorable than existing Iraqi laws on criminal
procedure under the 1971 Criminal Procedure Law.1 94 Thus, these provi-
sions of the Statute are in conformity with international humanitarian law,
but that does not resolve the problems of incongruities arising out of the
commingling of certain procedural aspects of the adversary-accusatorial
model of criminal procedure with that of the inquisitorial model.
With respect to substance, the crimes defined in Articles 11 to 13 vio-
late the principles of legality' 95 as they have been understood and applied
182. See Hague IV, supra note 180, at arts. 43, 48; Geneva IV, supra note 145, at arts.
51, 54, 64.
183. See Hague IV, supra note 180, at art. 43.
184. Geneva IV, supra note 145, at art. 54.
185. Id. at art. 64.
186. Id.
187. Id. at arts. 79-135.
188. Id. at art. 64.
189. Id. at art. 70.
190. Geneva IV, supra note 145, at art. 7.
191. Id. at art. 64.
192. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, art. 4, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1979).
193. See PAUST, supra note 181.
194. Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 173. For a discussion of international
human rights law standards, see generally M. CHERIF BASsIOUNI, THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A COMPENDIUM OF UNITED NATIONS
NoRMs AND STANDARDS (1994); ANNE BAYEFSKY, THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM:
UNIVERSALITY AT THE CROSSROADS (2001); CHRISTOPHER GANE & MARK MACKAREL, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS (1997).
195. See discussion infra Parts IV.E.2-3.
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in Iraqi criminal law since the 1925 Constitution.1 9 6 Iraq also follows a
rigid positivistic approach to the nonretroactivity of criminal laws, and that
is consonant with international human rights law.19 7 The principles of
legality are enunciated in Article 15 in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.19 8 The same prohibition also exists under Article 7 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, 199 Article 9 of the American
Convention on Human Rights, 20 0 and Article 7 of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples Rights. 2 0 1 The principles of legality are part of "gen-
eral principles of law," a source of international law under Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is part of the UN Char-
ter.20 2 An occupying power cannot derogate from these principles. Moreo-
ver, the selection of the judges as discussed below20 3 in Part IV.D.1
contravenes the Iraqi pre-Ba'ath law on judicial selection and international
human rights law on judicial independence and impartiality. This aspect
of the Statute is also questionable.
The limitations imposed by the Geneva Conventions are purposely
strict in order to avoid abuse of authority by an occupying power. The
unarticulated premise is that a foreign occupying power must be given less
discretion because it cannot be assumed to always act in the best interests
of the occupied and because its interest and presence in the occupied terri-
tory is for a limited time.
C. Issues of Legality in the Statute
1. The "Exceptional" Nature of the Tribunal
The IST is referred to in the Arabic language version of the Statute as
Al-Mahkama Al-Mukhtassa. This could have been translated as "specialized
tribunal" or "competent tribunal." However, the controlling English lan-
guage text chose the term "special" tribunal, which translates into Arabic
as Al-Mahkama al-Khassa. Thus, the name and a number of the Statute's
provisions make it an "exceptional" tribunal, in violation of Article 14 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). 20 4
196. 1925 Constitution, supra note 132.
197. See e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 6
I.L.M. 368 (1967) (entered into force March 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. Iraq signed
the ICCPR on March 23, 1976. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Trea-
ties, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last updated June 9, 2004).
198. ICCPR, supra note 197, at art. 15.
199. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221.
200. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
(entered into force July 18, 1978).
201. African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/
LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
202. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to "General Principles of
International Law," 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 768 (1990); BAssIOUNI, supra note 40, at
198-204.
203. See discussion infra Part V.D.1.
204. ICCPR, supra note 197, at art. 14.
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This provision requires states to guarantee the fair and public trial of indi-
viduals by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established in
accordance with ordinary applicable law and prohibits the establishment of
exceptional tribunals.20 5 It should be noted that the existence of a conflict,
whether of an international or noninternational character, does not sus-
pend the applicability of international human rights law, and that interna-
tional humanitarian law and human rights law are coextensive.
20 6
Article 14 of the ICCPR prohibits, by implication, exceptional tribu-
nals, or, more significantly, in French, "tribunaux d'exceptions.''20 7 The
IST is a special tribunal in that it is not part of the ordinary system of
justice. Its special nature is evidenced by its temporary existence, and for
the exercise of jurisdiction over only certain crimes committed within a
defined period of time, and only by certain persons. The exceptional
nature of the IST, which contradicts international human rights norms, is
reflected in the characteristics described below:
1. The establishment of the IST by an occupying power violates the
Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian
law applicable to conflicts of an international character. 20 8
2. The specific naming of the Tribunal as a "special" judicial body
violates the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights.20 9
205. Setting up the IST as a "special" tribunal will also inevitably lead to comparisons
with the various "special" tribunals set up by the Ba'ath regime in various agencies, such
as the secret police (the mukhabarat), the military, the police, and the Ba'ath party itself.
These tribunals were a significant factor in the degeneration of the Iraqi judiciary and
the Iraqi judicial process.
206. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestin-
ian Territory, 2004 L.CJ. No. 131 (July 9); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Humanitarian Law, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HumA.iTY 467-76 (Dinah Shelton et. al.
eds., 2004).
207. See ICCPR, supra note 197, at art. 14. The term is more significant in French
because until about 1950, most of the countries in the world followed the Roman-
ist-Civilist system. Between 1945-50, a number of these countries, particularly in
Europe, established tribunaux d'exceptions to try Nazi collaborators. This procedure
was also used by Communist regimes to purge those who opposed them. In the 1950s
and 1960s, France also used similar tribunals to preserve its colonial system. By 1966,
when the ICCPR was adopted, the prohibition against tribunals specifically contem-
plated tribunaux d'exceptions. More particularly, "exceptional tribunals" were used by
several regimes as part of their repressive systems. Thus, the French term has more
significant legal consequences than its English counterpart.
208. See infra Part IV.B. It should be noted that the Security Council adopted a num-
ber of resolutions in the aftermath of the Coalition forces' invasion of Iraq. See supra
note 125. Some of these resolutions are ambiguous and somewhat confusing with
respect to the legal status of the CPA, the GC, and the interim government. In fact, some
of their provisions may appear to contradict the provisions of the Geneva Conventions
regarding an occupying power's obligations. In any event, it is important to know that
the Geneva Conventions control and that Security Council Resolutions do not amend
those obligations. Thus, nothing in these resolutions can be interpreted in a manner
which is inconsistent with either conventional or customary international humanitarian
law.
209. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1.
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3. The assignment of English as the Tribunal's controlling language
is in violation of Iraqi law, which requires Arabic to be the official
language of the state.210
4. The appointment of sitting judges, investigative judges, and prose-
cutors by a temporary political authority, the GC, whose authority
was derived from the occupying power, affects judicial indepen-
dence and the impartiality of the Tribunal. 2 1 1
5. The Statute's provision on appointing foreign judges may be in
violation of Iraqi law.2 12
6. The appointment of foreign experts and observers as monitors,
and the conduct of criminal investigations by foreign experts not
under the control of the investigative judges, is in violation of
Iraqi law.2 13
7. The Statute confuses the roles of investigative judges and prosecu-
tors, which results in violations of Iraqi procedural law, possibly
to the detriment of the defense's rights. 2 14
8. The determination of compensation of the sitting judges, investi-
gative judges, and prosecutors by a temporary political authority,
the GC, appointed by an occupying power, affects judicial inde-
pendence and the impartiality of the Tribunal, and thus consti-
tutes a violation of international human rights law.2 1 5
9. The exclusion of sitting judges, investigative judges, and prosecu-
tors solely on grounds of membership in the Ba'ath party,
infringes upon the principle of impartiality. 2 16
10. The failure to allow for challenges of judges and investigative
judges on the basis of conflict of interest or partiality violates the
principle of judicial impartiality established in international
human rights law.2 17
11. The definition of crimes in the Statute that are not contained in
Iraqi law are in violation of the principles of legality2 18 recognized
in Iraqi law and international human rights law.
A repromulgated, amended law that conforms to the relevant Iraqi
laws and general principles of criminal law and procedure recognized
210. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
211. See discussion infra Part IV.D.1. Even though, de facto, the selection of sitting
judges, investigative judges, and prosecutors may have been appropriate and the persons
chosen satisfactory, nevertheless the issue here is the process and not the personalities
involved.
212. See discussion infra Part IV.D.2.
213. See discussion infra Part IV.D.3.
214. See discussion infra Parts IV.E.4-5.
215. See discussion infra Part IV.D.5.
216. See discussion infra Part IV.D.6.
217. See discussion infra Part IV.E.9. While the Statute does not provide for chal-
lenges of a judge's ability to impartially adjudicate a given case, its silence on the ques-
tion arguably permits a reference to preexisting Iraqi laws, which may allow for such
challenges. Nevertheless, this assumption would require judicial interpretation exceed-
ing the traditional role of judges in an essentially positivistic legal system.
218. See discussion infra Part IV.F.
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under Iraqi law, international humanitarian law, and human rights law
can cure these problems.
2. Language
The Statute was promulgated in both the English and Arabic lan-
guages, but under the CPA Regulation 1 the English version controls 219
even though Arabic is the only official language of Iraq. The Arabic version
is a poor translation of the English text, revealing that even the English text
was not drafted by Iraqi jurists.
The fact that the Statute was originally drafted in English and that the
English version, rather than the Arabic version, controls in the event of any
conflict or inconsistency between the two versions is problematic. Moreo-
ver, the Statute contains an inconsistency, as Article 34 of the Statute pro-
vides that "Arabic shall be the official language of the Tribunal." The
controlling language of the Statute is English, while the proceedings and
judgments are to be conducted in the Arabic language. 220
A language is reflective and expressive of a given culture. Requiring
Iraqi Arabic-speaking jurists to interpret and apply a Statute that was
drafted in the language of a foreign legal system and culture is not only
unworkable; it is fraught with ambiguities. Also, like other aspects of the
Statute discussed below, drafting the Statute in the English language and
the choice of the English version as the governing version reinforces the
view that the IST bears a "Made in USA" stamp, which undermines the
legitimacy and credibility of the IST.
It could be argued, however, that CPA Order Number 48 delegated to
the GC the power to adopt the Statute. Consequently, it may be said that
the English language controls as to CPA Order Number 48, but not as to
the Statute which was promulgated by the GC on the basis of that Order's
delegation of authority. Such an interpretation would be more in keeping
with Article 34 of the Statute, which requires the proceedings to be in
English. Obviously, a repromulgation in Arabic of the Statute by an Iraqi
governmental authority having such power would eliminate any such
questions.
219. CPA Reg. No. 1, § 3(2). According to CPA Regulation Number 1, the English
version controls over the Arabic version in the event of any conflict or inconsistency. It
was the CPA's practice to issue Decrees in the English language first, with Arabic ver-
sions issued subsequently. In some cases the Arabic versions were issued more than
143 days later, as was the case with CPA Order Number 10 regarding the Management of
Detention and Prison Facilities. The English version of this order was issued on June 5,
2003. See CPA Order No. 10, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20
030605_CPAORD1OManagementofDetention andPrisonFacilities.pdf (last visited
Mar. 13, 2005). However, the Arabic version was not issued until October 29, 2003. For
further discussion of this issue, see Amnesty International, Iraq: Memorandum on Con-
cerns Related to Legislation Introduced by the Coalition Provisional Authority, available
at http://www.amnesty.nl/persberichten/NK-PB0357.shtml (Dec. 4, 2003). To the best
knowledge of this writer, it is common practice for independent states to require that
laws be promulgated first in the official language or languages of those states. Only
states under colonial regimes enacted laws in the language of the colonial power.
220. See THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL art. 34.
Vol. 38
2005 Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq
D. Challenges to Judicial Independence and Impartiality
The following are a number of issues pertaining to judicial indepen-
dence and impartiality that contribute to undermining the credibility of the
IST and that, unless corrected in the repromulgated, amended law pro-
posed above, are likely to be raised by the defense at the trials.2 2 1
1. Appointment of Iraqi Judges, Investigative Judges, and Prosecutors
The now defunct GC, a political body whose authority derived from
the CPA, established by an occupying power, had the power to appoint the
sitting judges, 2 22 the investigative judges,2 2 3 and the prosecutors under the
Statute. 22 4 The Statute gives the Judicial Council only a limited consulta-
tive role. 225 In fact, these appointments have been made by the Prime Min-
ister, presumably on the basis of a decision of the Council of Ministers in
consultation with some of the members of the Judicial Council. This pro-
cedure violates Articles 1 to 5 of the 1985 United Nations' Principles of the
Independence of the Judiciary, which disfavor having judicial appoint-
ments by political authority. 22 6 Ironically, this selection process is similar
to the Ba'athist approach, whose 1977 Law on the Organization of the Judi-
ciary placed the Minister of Justice as the head of the Judicial Council
instead of the President of the Court of Cassation.22 7 The Ba'ath regime
obviously interfered with judicial independence by having a representative
221. As stated above, nothing in what follows is intended to question the integrity of
the judges, investigative judges, and prosecutors appointed to the IST by the GC.
222. THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL art. 5(c).
223. Art. 7(b).
224. Art. 8(d).
225. Art. 5(c) (stating that "[]udges are to be nominated and appointed by the Gov-
erning Council or the Successor Government, after consultation with the Judicial
Council").
226. See Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Seventh United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, at 59, 7th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1 (1985). The Seventh United Nations Congress took
place in Milan from August 26 to September 6, 1985. For an Arab perspective on the
independence of the judiciary, see FAROUK EL-KILANI, ISTIQLAL AL-QADA'A [INDEPENDENCE
OF THE JUDICIARY] (1999).
227. In 1954, the Iraqi Parliament passed a law that established an independent Judi-
cial Council (Majlis al-Qadha), presided over by the President of the Court of Cassation,
the judicial system's highest court. However, in 1977, Law Number 101 (Qanun Wezarat
al-Adl) adopted by the Revolutionary Command Council established the Law Organiz-
ing the Ministry of Justice. That law placed the judiciary, the prosecution, and the
courts under the control of the executive branch, specifically the Ministry of Justice.
The 1979 Judicial Organization Law, infra note 228, reorganized the Judicial Council as
the Justice Council (Majlis al-Adl) and elevated the Ministry of Justice to the position of
its president, placing all of the courts under the Ministry ofJustice. CPA Order Number
35 reinstated the Judicial Council, thereby abrogating provisions of the 1979 Judicial
Organization Law, infra note 228. CPA Order No. 35 (Sept. 18, 2003), available at http:/
/www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030921 CPAORD35.pdf (last visited Apr. 5,
2005). Article 2(3) of CPA Order Number 35 reinstating the Judicial Council as the
President of the Court of Cassation. Id. at art. 2(3). Mahkamat Al Tami'ize, the
equivalent of the French Cour de Cassation, is frequently referred to as the Court of
Cassation, although the term does not exist in English. In French, "casser" means "to
quash," whose equivalent in English is to reverse a judgment by a lesser court.
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of the Executive branch chair the Council and direct it. For the IST to fol-
low the model of the Ba'ath regime, while at the same time prosecuting its
leaders, is, to say the least, paradoxical. Adding to these problems is the
uncertainty as to who actually appointed the IST judicial officers. Moreo-
ver, some of the judges who were appointed are Iraqi practicing lawyers,
and this violates the Iraqi law on judicial appointments, which requires
that judges be graduates of the Judicial Institute who qualify for certain
levels of judicial appointment, namely, trial court, appellate court, and
supreme court. These issues, unless resolved in a repromulgated, amended
law, followed by new formal appointments by the Judicial Council, will
surely be raised by the defense at the trials as violating judicial
independence.
2. Appointment of Foreign Judges
Pursuant to Article 4(d) of the Statute, the GC and its successor may
appoint foreign judges to the IST provided that they fulfill certain criteria,
which do not include familiarity with the Arabic language or the Iraqi legal
system. The appointment by a political authority of foreign judges who
lack familiarity with the Arabic language and the Iraqi legal system is con-
trary to Iraqi law. 228 It is also contrary to the law and practice of almost
every legal system in the world. Moreover, even if such appointments were
legally valid, such foreign judges would have an adverse impact on the Tri-
bunal's ability to effectively perform its functions. Appointment of non-
Arab judges should be excluded for reasons of qualifications, appropriate-
ness, and practicality, as they are not likely to have knowledge of Iraqi laws
and of the Arabic language, which is the language of the proceedings.
A better solution previously advocated by this writer 2 29 is to have
highly qualified Arab judges who would be designated by the Iraqi Judicial
Council for their expertise and experience. Such appointments could also
include highly competent Arab jurists who are not judges, but whose
expertise, knowledge, and reputation would lend weight to the IST. The
use of Arab judges is a practice followed in the Arab Gulf states where, in
light of the similarities in legal systems, states may use the services of
judges from other Arab states to fill in as necessary. 2 30
228. See Law 160 of 1979, QANUN AL-TANZIM AL-QADA'I [IRAQI JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION
LAw] art. 4(1) [hereinafter Judicial Organization Law].
229. See supra note 61.
230. It should be noted that the Criminal Code promulgated by Law No. 111 of 1969,
infra note 251, and the Criminal Procedure Law of 1971, supra note 194, are derived
from the Egyptian and Syrian legal systems, which in turn derives from the French legal
system. For sources on Egyptian Criminal Law, see NAGIB HOSNI, SHARH QANUN AL-
UQUBAT AL-QISM AL-A'M [EXPLANATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL PART] (1962);
AHMED AwAD BELAL, MABADE' QANUN EL-UQUBAT EL-MASRI AL-QISM AL-A'M [PRINCIPLES OF
EGYPTIAN CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL PART] (2004); 1 AHMED AWAD BELAL, [PRINCIPLES OF
EGYPTIAN CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL PART, CRIMINAL OFFENCES] (2004); MAHMOUD MUSTAFA,
SHARH QANUN EL-UQUBAT AL-QISM AL-A'M [EXPLANATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL
PART] (10th ed. 1983); NAGIB HOSNI, SHARH QANUN AL-UQUBAT AL-NAZARIA AL-A'M FIL
GARIMA WAL-EKAB [EXPLANATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT] (6th ed. 1989); AH-MED FATHY SOROUR, AL-WASEET F1 QANUN AL-UQUBAT AL-
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While the Statute does not address the issue of qualifications of for-
eign judges, the Judicial Council should apply the same professional and
moral qualifications for appointments of Arab judges and jurists as it does
for appointments to its higher court. These qualifications should be made
public, and a record of the selection process and reasons for the appoint-
ments should be made. This is to ensure transparency and to reinforce
public perception of the technical competence and integrity of the judges.
This would surely contribute to the legitimacy and credibility of the Tribu-
nal in and outside of Iraq.
3. Appointment of Foreign Judicial "Experts" and "Observers"
Pursuant to Article 6(b) of the Statute, the President of the IST is
required to appoint non-Iraqi nationals "to act in advisory capacities or as
observers to the Trial Chambers and to the Appeals Chamber."2 3 1 Articles
7(n) and 8(j) provide for similar appointments with respect to investigative
judges and prosecutors. The Statute, however, does not clarify the proce-
dures relating to, or the nature of, this advisory or observatory role to be
assumed by such foreign nationals. This in turn raises various concerns,
including how the secrecy of judicial deliberations required by Iraqi law
may be maintained when non-Iraqi experts are required to observe the
trials.
Requiring the IST judges, investigative judges, and prosecutors to be
observed or monitored by foreign experts as per Articles 6(b), 7(a), and
8(j) of the Statute, 23 2 is unprecedented except in prior colonial regimes.
This cannot be well-received by members of the Iraqi legal profession and
is probably the most offensive provision in the Statute. Moreover, the pres-
ence of foreign observers casts doubt on the independence of the sitting
Iraqi judges, investigative judges, and prosecutors.
It should be noted that Article 6(b) of the Statute was not necessary to
achieve the purported goal of having the technical support of nonnational
QISM AL-KHAAS [A MANUAL OF CRIMINAL LAW: SPECIAL PART] (3rd ed., n.d., circa 2000).
For sources on Egyptian Criminal Procedure, see AHMED FATHY SOROUR, AL-SHARI'A WAL
EJRAAT AL-JENA'EIA [LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] (1977); NAGIB HOSNI, SHARH
QANUN AL-EJRAAT AL-JENA'EIA [EXPLANATION OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAw] (1982);
AHMED FATHY SOROUR, AL-WASEET F1 QANUN AL-EJRAAT AL-JENA'EIA [A MANUAL ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE LAw] (7th ed. 2002). For sources on Iraqi criminal law, see ALY HASSAN
KHALAF & SULTAN ABDULKADER AL-SHAWl, AL-MABADE' AL-A'M Fi QANUN AL-UQUBAT [GEN-
ERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW] (n.d.); DARI KHALIL MAHMOUD, AL-WAJIZ FI SHARH
QANUN AL-UQUBAT AL-QISM AL-A'M [SIMPLIFIED EXPLANATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: GEN-
ERAL PART] (2002). For sources on Iraqi criminal procedure, see 1 SAMI EL-NASRAWI,
DERASAT F1 QANUN AL-EJRAAT AL-JENA'EIA [STUDIES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGA-
TIONS, INTERROGATIONS, AND INDICTMENT] (1978); ABDEL AMIR EL-EKILY & SELIM IBRAHIM
HARBA, AL-EJRAAT AL-JENA'EIA [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] (1988).
Differences exist, however, between the Iraqi Ba'ath and contemporary Egyptian crim-
inal justice systems. For example, the Iraqi criminal legal system separates the powers of
investigative judges and prosecutors, whereas the Egyptian system combines these pow-
ers in public prosecutors who work under the control of the Prosecutor General. See
discussion supra Part IV.A.
231. See THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL art. 6(b).
232. Id. at arts. 6(b), 7(a), and 80).
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judges. Article 166 of the 1971 Criminal Procedure Law already provides
for the appointment of experts.
2 33
The repromulgated, amended Statute should enable the Tribunal to
employ foreign experts to serve as part of a pool, under the direction of its
president. Such experts may provide nonbinding advice on questions of
law to the president or to the various trial chambers of the Tribunal, at the
president's direction. Their role should not affect the independence of the
judges or their impartiality. Moreover, there can be no provision in the
repromulgated, amended law for foreign judges or experts to monitor the
work of the Tribunal or to sit in on the deliberations of the judges.
4. Qualifications of Judges, Investigative Judges, and Prosecutors
The IST does not establish professional qualifications for the appoint-
ment of its judges,2 34 but does so for investigative judges2 35 and prosecu-
tors,2 3 6 as is required by Iraqi laws on the subject.2 37 The appointment of
judges by a political body without fully going through the formal process
of selection by the Judicial Council, is troublesome. 238 Moreover, if special
qualifications are required, they should be set out by the Judicial Coun-
cil,23 9 which is to administer the appointing process with transparency. So
far, the selections have been made by the GC and the interim government,
subject to political vetting, and only in consultation with the Judicial Coun-
cil. Moreover, the appointment of practicing lawyers as judges violates the
Iraqi law on the judiciary. This process raises issues of legitimacy and
judicial impartiality. These issues are reminiscent of Ba'ath regime prac-
tices, when the Minister of Justice controlled the appointments of members
of the Judiciary.
5. Compensation of Judges and Investigating Judges
Pursuant to Articles 5(e) and 7(l) of the Statute, the GC, which is a
temporary political authority, sets the compensation of sitting judges and
investigating judges, "in light of the increased risks associated with the
position."240 While the general criterion is justified, it needs to be fully
articulated to avoid the taint of preferential ad hominem determinations,
233. Art. 166 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides that "the court may appoint
one or more experts in relation to matters which require an opinion, and determine his
[sic] compensation without excess, which shall be borne by the Treasury." Criminal
Procedure Law, supra note 194.
234. See THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL art. 5(a).
235. Id. at art. 7(d).
236. Id. at art. 8.
237. Law No. 159 of 1979, QANUN AL-EDDE'A AL-A'M [LAw OF PROSECUTORS] art. 41
[hereinafter Law of Prosecutors] (indicating the role of Public Prosecutors); Judicial
Organization Law, supra note 228, at art. 36.
238. See supra Part IV.D.1.
239. Judicial Organization Law, supra note 228; see THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL
TRIBUNAL art. 5(c) ("Judges are to be nominated and appointed by the Governing
Council").
240. Id. at arts. 5(c), 7(l).
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which violate the principles of a judiciary's independence. 24 1 Compensa-
tion should be legislatively established as it is in most of the world's legal
systems, and variances in compensation could be established by the Judi-
cial Council, but pursuant to a law that provides criteria and transparency.
6. Ba'ath Party Membership Disqualification
Article 33 of the Statute provides that "[njo officer, prosecutor, investi-
gative judge, judge or other personnel of the Tribunal shall have been a
member of the Ba'ath Party. '24 2 This blanket exclusion applies to all mem-
bers of the Iraqi judiciary who were in office as of March 2003 when the
United States occupied Iraq, but does not apply to other members of the
judiciary. 24 3 This provision also does not distinguish between judges who
were active members in the party and those who may have simply joined
the party to maintain their source of livelihood. The problem here is that
such blanket exclusions of Ba'ath party members, many of whom are likely
to have suffered at the hands of the Ba'ath regime, 244 may be cause for
concern with respect to the impartiality of sitting judges and investigative
judges.24 5 This concern is heightened by the fact that the Statute does not
provide for grounds to challenge judicial personnel on the basis of lack of
impartiality as discussed below.
7. Impartiality
The issue of judges' impartiality is unrelated to membership in the
Ba'ath party. A judge who was victimized by the Ba'ath regime is as much
subject to partiality as is a judge who was a member of that party. 246 The
241. See Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra note 226.
242. See THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL art. 33.
243. The assumption is based on the fact that judicial appointments under the Ba'ath
regime favored Ba'ath party members. However, many Ba'ath party members were only
registered as a matter of expediency and did not play an active role in the party, while
others were appointed because relatives held positions in the party and used that influ-
ence to obtain positions through their family members. Some members of the Judicial
Council were registered Ba'ath party members.
244. See THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL arts. 5(f)(1)(i), 7(m)(1)(i) and
8(f)(l)(i), which, in setting out bases for automatic disqualification of judges, investiga-
tive tribunal judges and prosecutors that include criminal records, recognize an excep-
tion if the relevant individual's criminal record is "a political or false charge made by the
Ba'ath Party regime."
245. It should be noted that the GC and CPA have appointed cabinet officers and
judges who were Ba'ath party members. This includes cabinet officers presently serving
in the interim government as of June 30, 2004, and members of the Judicial Council who
had a role in vetting the judges of the IST.
246. Judge Dara Nureddin, former member of the GC, was nominated to sit on the
appellate division of the IST, but recused himself because he had previously been
imprisoned by the Saddam regime. Judge Dara, whom this writer has the privilege of
knowing, is held in high esteem in Iraq. He is the only judge in Iraq to have declared as
legally invalid a decree issued by Saddam, for which he was imprisoned. After two years
in jail, he was released by a quirk of fate. Saddam decided in March 2003, shortly before
the invasion, to free an estimated 20,000 (some put that number at 80,000) common
prisoners in Iraq. Many of these have become sources of Iraq's insecurity during the
occupation, as Saddam had hoped. Judge Dara, whose sentence for his courageous
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Statute fails to articulate a standard of impartiality and fails to address the
issue of challenges to the judges for lack of impartiality or conflict of inter-
est. The reason for these omissions confirms these concerns. The drafters,
in this writer's opinion, wanted the process of appointing the judges,
namely by the GC, to be a political one.24 7 This should be remedied in the
repromulgated, amended law by developing procedures for challenges and
by establishing standards for recusal of judges and investigative judges.
8. Removal of the Tribunal's President
Article 5(f)(3) of the-Statute gives the GC the authority to remove the
president of the IST. This is a gross breach of the independence of the
judges, who must be shielded against political removal of their president.
Removal and discipline under Iraqi law are the prerogatives of the Judicial
Council. 248 This issue is probably moot now that the GC is no longer in
existence, unless this authority is exercised by the government of Iraq.
This provision should be deleted from the repromulgated, amended law,
leaving removal of any judge for cause to the prerogative of the Judicial
Council. 249
V. Substantive Issues of Legality: Crimes and Penalties
A. Introduction
Articles 11 to 14 refer to subject matter jurisdiction for crimes com-
mitted by Iraqi nationals or residents of Iraq. Given the general principle
recognized under all national criminal legal systems relating to personal
jurisdiction that a national criminal court has personal jurisdiction over all
individuals committing a crime within the territory of the state irrespective
of their nationality or residence status, it is not clear why the IST's jurisdic-
tion under Article 1 does not extend to all individuals who may be accused
of the crimes set out in Articles 11 to 14 of the Statute who are not Iraqi
nationals or residents of Iraq as referred to in Article 10.
The Statute also limits the temporal jurisdiction of the 1ST to crimes
committed between July 17, 1968 and May 1, 2003, but does not provide a
limitation related to where the crimes were committed.250 Accordingly,
there does not appear to be any need to expressly refer to the crimes com-
mitted by Iraqi nationals and residents related to the Iraq-Iran war and the
invasion and occupation of Kuwait as falling within the IST's jurisdiction
in Article 1(b) of the Statute, since such crimes are already included in the
IST's jurisdiction. In this regard, it should be noted that Iraqi legislation
action was likened to that of a common criminal, was thus released. Judge Dara's story
is one example of how ironies make history.
247. See discussion supra Part IV.D.1.
248. Judicial Organization Law, supra note 228, at arts. 58-59; The Law 101 of 1977,
Regarding the Ministry of Justice, art. 4(2)(a).
249. Judicial Organization Law, supra note 228, at arts. 58-59.
250. See J. Peter Pham, Bringing Saddam Hussein to Justice, 3 IN THE NAT'L INTEREST 5
(July 7, 2004), at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol3lssue27/Vol3lssue
27PhamPFV.html.
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contemplates jurisdiction over crimes committed outside Iraq: Pursuant to
Article 7 of the 1969 Criminal Code, for example, Iraqi territorial jurisdic-
tion extends to "foreign territories occupied by the Iraqi army in relation to
crimes which affect the army's safety or interests,"25 1 and pursuant to Arti-
cle 53(b) of the 1971 Criminal Procedure Law, "if a crime is committed
outside Iraq, the investigation thereof will be performed by one of the
investigative judges [selected] by the Minister of Justice. 25 2
The maxims nulla poene sine lege and nullum crimen sine lege have
long been regarded as cornerstone principles of criminal law.2 53 They
have become known in almost all of the world's legal systems as the princi-
ples of legality. They are also embodied in Article 15 of the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 25 4 Article 7 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, 25 5 and Article 9 of the American Convention on
Human Rights. 2 56 Many constitutions include them as well. 25 7 In the U.S.
Constitution they are specifically mentioned as the prohibitions against "ex
post facto" laws and against "Bills of Attainder,"2 58 and its Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments have been interpreted as prohibiting statutes that are
vague and ambiguous. 25 9 The Iraqi legal system, which is a positivist one,
is more categorical about the principles of legality. The IST Statute violates
these principles by borrowing the definition of the crimes of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes from the ICC statute Articles 6,
7, and 8,260 which are not contained in the 1969 Iraqi Criminal Code.2 61
These issues and the issue of penalties are discussed below.
B. Defining the Three Core Crimes
Articles 11, 12, and 13 of the Statute extend the jurisdiction of the IST
to three international core crimes, namely, genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. Article 14 applies to other crimes under Iraqi
law.26 2 The Statute defines the three core crimes identically to the defini-
tions contained in the ICC statute,2 63 though without establishing a foun-
251. Law No. 111 of 1969, QANUN AL-UQUBAT [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 7 (hereinafter
Criminal Code].
252. Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 194, at para. 53(b).
253. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAw 150-58 (2d ed. 1999).
254. See ICCPR, supra note 197, at art. 15.
255. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 199, at art. 7.
256. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 200, at art. 9.
257. See, e.g., EGYPT CONST. art. 66; FR. CONST. arts. 7-8; ITALY CONST. arts. 25, 26.
See generally CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein &
Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1993) (compiling the constitutions of many countries).
258. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
259. Id. at amends. V, XIV; see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972) (declaring a Florida vagrancy ordinance void for vagueness).
260. See Rome Statute, supra note 152, at arts. 6-8.
261. Criminal Code, supra note 251.
262. See infra Part IV.E.3.
263. See Rome Statute, supra note 152, at arts. 6-8. The reason for this formula is
that in modeling the IST to one of the three proposals I made to the Future of Iraq
Working Group on Transitional Justice, one of the models was for a Security Council-
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dation for their application under Iraqi law. This approach on its face
violates the principles of legality, 264 since these crimes are not covered in
the 1969 Criminal Code, 2 65 nor were they separately promulgated in
another national legislation published in the Official Gazette of Iraq.
26 6
This problem can be addressed in the repromulgated, amended law as
follows:
1. Genocide and War Crimes
The violation of the principles of legality in the Statute with respect to
the crime of genocide and war crimes can be resolved by interpreting the
principles of legality in a manner that distinguishes between the formal
aspect of these "principles" (promulgation in national Iraqi legislation and
publication in the Official Gazette) and the substantive aspects of the prin-
ciples of legality, which require ensuring that public notice of such crimes
has been provided prior to the commission of the criminalized acts. Such
an interpretation would be based on the proposition that the crimes of
genocide and war crimes are contained in the conventions that have been
ratified by Iraq,2 6 7 even though they have not been the subject of national
established Tribunal. See supra Part 1I. Under the model for a Security Council-estab-
lished tribunal, I used the ICC Statute for the definitions of the crimes. As Chairman of
the Diplomatic Conference's Drafting Committee, it was also natural that I would make
such a choice. Salem Chalabi, who had the principal role in drafting the IST Statute,
followed that approach without regard to the fact that what is appropriate for a Security
Council-established tribunal is not appropriate for an Iraqi national tribunal. See supra
note 75. It should be noted that the United States, even though it opposes the ICC, does
not disagree with the contents of ICC Articles 6, 7, and 8, nor does it disagree with the
"Elements of Crimes" developed by the ICC's Preparatory Commission and later
adopted by its Assembly of States Parties. Military Penal Law, infra note 272, at art. 123.
In fact, the U.S. delegation at the Rome conference and during the Preparatory Commis-
sion's work was instrumental in the shaping of these provisions. The United States'
opposition to the ICC refers to its jurisdiction over nonnationals of states parties. Wil-
liam A. Schabass, United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It's All About
the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 701, 709-14 (2004).
264. The principles of legality, which prohibit crime or penalty without a specific
legal textual description that is clear (not vague or ambiguous), and the retroactive appli-
cation of criminal laws and penalties, are recognized in the 1969 Criminal Code, supra
note 251, and in general principles of the criminal laws of more than 120 of the world's
criminal justice systems, international criminal law, and international humanitarian
law. See ICCPR, supra note 197, at art. 15; European Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 199, at art. 7; Rome Statute, supra note 152, at arts. 22 (nullum crimen sine
lege), 23 (nulla poena sine lege); BASSIOUNI, supra note 253, at 150-58; BASSIOUNI, supra
note 40, at 198-204.
265. See generally Criminal Code, supra note 251.
266. The ICTY faced the problem of potentially violating principles of legality; how-
ever, since the Yugoslav federal criminal code included the crime of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes and corresponding penalties, the ICTY was able to
rely upon them. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAs, THE LAW OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 689-705 (1996); VIRGINIA MORRIS
& MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 274-76 (1995).
267. See Geneva I-IV, supra note 145. Iraq acceded to all the Geneva Conventions on
February 14, 1956. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. Iraq acceded to the Genocide
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Iraqi legislation published in the Official Gazette of Iraq. Accordingly, the
formal aspects of the principles of legality may be set aside in favor of its
substantive aspects. Moreover, these crimes have been publicly known in
Iraq, and the prospective defendants and others in the upper echelons of
the regime leadership can be assumed to have had knowledge of these
crimes.2 68
The repromulgated, amended law should specifically include a refer-
ence to Iraq's ratification of the Genocide Convention 269 and the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949,270 which apply to these crimes. Moreover,
the explanatory memorandum should cross-reference the definitions of
these crimes to their specific contents in the 1969 Criminal Code27 1 and in
the 1940 Iraqi Military Penal Law. 27 2 In this way, the crimes in question
could be relied upon in prosecutions, even though they do not satisfy the
formal aspects of the principles of legality, namely, the inclusion of these
crimes in a national law and its publication in the Official Gazette.
2 73
Another argument is that such international crimes, being jus
cogens, 2 74 penetrate national law and cannot be derogated from because
they are peremptory norms of international law.
These arguments should be described in the explanatory memoran-
dum, distinguishing between the substantive and formal aspects of the
principles of legality and demonstrating the basis of direct applicability
under international law.2 75 This memorandum would clarify that
although the formal aspects of the principles of legality may not have been
met, the substantive aspects have been satisfied, and, accordingly, the Tri-
bunal's jurisdiction over the crime of genocide and war crimes does not
Convention on January 20, 1959. For details of state parties to the Convention, see
Ratifications and Reservations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/
ratification/1.htm. (last updated Nov. 24, 2004).
268. In substance, the Nuremburg judgment established that defendants are assumed
to have knowledge of crimes against humanity, regardless of whether those crimes have
been promulgated as positive law. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 253, at 525-31.
269. See Ratifications and Reservations, supra note 267.
270. See Geneva I-IV, supra note 145.
271. Criminal Code, supra note 251.
272. QANUN AL-UQUBAT AL-ASKARIA [MILITARY PENAL LAW], Law No. 13 of 1940 [herein-
after Military Penal Law].
273. Legal doctrine and practice in Iraq deems that a treaty, even if ratified, must be
subject to the adoption of national implementing legislation before it can be considered
applicable domestically. Additionally, under Iraqi law, all laws must be published in the
Official Gazette.
274. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 40, at 167.
275. It should be noted that Iraq is not only a state that adheres to a rigid positivistic
approach, but it is also a dualist state, where treaties must be incorporated in national
legislation and published in the Official Gazette before their applicability. This is also
the position of all other Arab states. Moreover, Iraqi jurists have been isolated from
international law developments for some forty years. Consequently, it is difficult for
that country to accept changes that took a long time to seep into the thinking of other
countries' jurists.
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violate the principles of legality. 27 6
2. Crimes Against Humanity
Remedying the violation of the principles of legality with respect to
crimes against humanity is more problematic than with respect to genocide
and war crimes. Unlike the former, this category of international crimes
has not been included in a specialized international convention. 2 77 Thus,
Iraq is not bound by a treaty as it is with respect to genocide and war
crimes. However, crimes against humanity have been defined in different
ways by various international instruments 2 78 and are jus cogens. 27 9 Most
of the contents of crimes against humanity are, however, included in the
1969 Criminal Code. 28 0 The explanatory memorandum of the repromul-
gated, amended law should articulate the reasons for the permeation of jus
cogens principles and customary international law into Iraqi domestic
law.28 1 Given that this theory has never been argued before in any Arab
court, it would be highly advisable to prepare an appropriate authoritative
legal interpretation with respect to this issue prior to the commencement of
any trials before the Tribunal.
An alternative approach to avoiding a violation of the principles of
legality is to divide the above three crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes into several lesser crimes that are usually found
in most domestic criminal codes, including the 1969 Criminal Code and
the 1940 Military Penal Law. For example, the 1969 Criminal Code
criminalizes the following crimes: (1) unlawful detention; 28 2 (2) use of per-
son as object of mockery; 28 3 (3) cruelty; 28 4 (4) torture;28 5 (5) intentional
276. Detailing this argument in an explanatory memorandum would also provide the
additional benefit of ensuring that IST judges do not reach opposing conclusions on the
issue.
277. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity": The Need for a Specialized
Convention, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457-94 (1994).
278. For various definitions of "crimes against humanity, see IMT Agreement, supra
note 97; Charter of the International Military Tribunal, at art. 6(c), 59 Stat. 1544, 1546,
82 U.N.T.S 279, 284; IMTFE Charter, supra note 98, at art. 5(c); International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., art. 5, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/808 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; International Tribunal for Rwanda,
S.C Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Rome Statute, supra note 152, at art. 7. For a discussion of
these and other formulations see BASSiOUNI, supra note 253.
279. See Criminal Code, supra note 251
280. For example, Article 325 of the Criminal Code, supra note 251, prohibits slavery.
See, e.g., Criminal Code, supra note 251, at arts. 325, 333, 421 (prohibiting slavery,
torture, and illegal detention and torture respectively). However, Iraq has not signed the
CAT, supra note 146.
281. For a detailed discussion on crimes against humanity and other jus cogens
crimes, see generally BAsSIouNI, supra note 253, at 210-17; BASSIOUN, supra note 40, at
684-704.
282. Criminal Code, supra note 251, at art. 322.
283. Id. at art. 325.
284. Id. at art. 332.
285. Id. at arts. 333. 421.
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damage of public property;28 6 (6) burning of petroleum wells;28 7 (7) inten-
tional spreading of dangerous diseases; 28 8 (8) persecution based on relig-
ious affiliation;28 9 (9) rape; 290 (10) killing two people or more;2 9 1 (11)
causing the disappearance of bodies; 292 (12) embezzlement; 29 3 and (13)
destroying real estate. 29 4 The 1940 Military Penal Law references, inter
alia, the following war crimes:29 5 (1) ordering an inferior to commit a
crime; 29 6 (2) the destruction of property;29 7 (3) the destruction of prop-
erty through the use of force;298 (4) the unlawful taking of the property of
the prisoners, wounded, and deceased; 29 9 and (5) overlooking criminal
acts. 30 0 Accordingly, it would be appropriate to refer to these crimes,
which are defined in Iraqi law, and to rely on them as elements of the three
international crimes mentioned above. 30 1
3. Other Crimes
Article 14 of the Statute states:
The Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons who have committed
crimes under Iraqi law:
a) For those outside the judiciary, the attempt to manipulate the judici-
ary or involvement in the functions of the judiciary, in violation,
inter alia, of the Iraqi interim constitution of 1970, as amended;
30 2
b) The wastage of national resources and the squandering of public
assets and funds, pursuant to, inter alia, Art. 2(g) of the Law No. 7 of
1958, as amended; and
c) The abuse of position or the pursuit of policies that may lead to the
threat of war or the use of armed forces of Iraq against an Arab coun-
try, in accordance with Art. 1 of Law No. 7 of 1958, as amended.
30 3
None of the above are, however, contained in the 1969 Criminal Code.
286. Id. at art. 340.
287. Id. at art. 342(b).
288. Id. at art. 368.
289. Id. at art. 372(a).
290. Id. at art. 393.
291. Id. at art. 405(e).
292. Id. at art. 420.
293. Id. at art. 444.
294. Id. at arts. 447-78.
295. The procedures relating to the trial of military personnel under Iraqi law are
governed by QANUN USUL A1-MUHAKAMAT EL-AsKARIA [MILITARY TRIAs PROCEDURAL LAW],
Law Number 13 of 1940.
296. Military Penal Law, supra note 272, at art. 98.
297. Id. at art. 113.
298. Id. at art. 114.
299. Id. at art. 115.
300. Id. at art. 123.
301. See U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (ICC-ASP/1/3) (describing the elements
of crimes in the International Criminal Court).
302. It should be noted that the 1970 Constitution contains no such crime; thus, this
is entirely ultra vires and therefore in violation of the principles of legality in Iraq and,
for that matter, in any legal system in the world.
303. THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL art. 5(e).
Cornell International Law Journal
4. Establishing Penalties
As stated above, the principles of legality require that penalties be
established by law. Article 24(c) of the Statute provides that "[t]he penalty
for any crimes under Articles 11 to 13 which do not have a counterpart
under Iraqi law shall be determined by the Trial Chambers taking into
account such factors as the gravity of the crime, the individual circum-
stances of the convicted person and the relevant international precedents."
It is contrary to these principles and to the 1969 Criminal Code to have
penalties established by judges, even though in advance of the Tribunal's
operations. This formula was taken by the IST drafters from ICTY, 30 4
where the Security Council delegated the legislative tasks to the judges, but
the exceptional nature of the ICTY, as established by the Security Council,
cannot serve as a precedent to an occupying power's limitations under
international humanitarian law.30 5
The delegation of legislative power by the IST to the judges to deter-
mine penalties for crimes under Articles 11 through 13 of the Statute
expressly conflicts with the principle that there can be no penalty without
an expressed provision in the law.30 6 Article 14 refers to existing crimes
under Iraqi criminal law, and penalties for these crimes are already pro-
vided for in Iraqi law.30 7 With respect to penalties for crimes contained in
Articles 11 to 13, they could be established by analogy to penalties con-
tained in the 1969 Criminal Code, though it violates the traditionally rigid
positivistic approach of Iraqi criminal law, which requires penalties to be
specifically established by law.
C. Immunity and Statutes of Limitations
The Statute's two related issues of removal of immunities provided to
the head of state and the members of the Revolutionary Command Coun-
cil, and the removal of statutes of limitations need to be addressed in the
repromulgated, amended law. More importantly, the explanatory memo-
randum to the repromulgated, amended law should explain the reasons for
the validity of removing these immunities 30 8 and for the nonapplicability
304. For further details on penalties and the ICTY, see BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra
note 266, at 689-710.
305. See THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL art. 14; see also discussion supra
Part V.B.
306. See Criminal Code, supra note 251. This also means that judges can impose the
death penalty with legislative authority. For a discussion of the status of the death pen-
alty, see generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (2002).
307. See discussion supra notes 282-301 and accompanying text.
308. In addition to immunity, the principle of "no responsibility due to ignorance of
the legal principle" is also likely to be raised as a defense. This principle was one of the
main defenses raised by the defendants in the post-Nuremburg regional trials and was
quickly debunked by the prosecution's argument that the mere attempt of the officials to
pass legislation affording themselves immunity from international law is a clear demon-
stration of their knowledge as to the criminal nature of their actions under international
law. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 253, at 505.
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of statutes of limitations.30 9
Given that Saddam Hussein will be on trial, the issue of head-of-state
immunity will be raised. Article 40 of the 1970 Iraqi Provisional Constitu-
tion,3 10 which is referenced in Article 14(a) of the Statute, affords the head
of the Iraqi state immunity, although this is contrary to international
law. 31 1 Immunity issues will also arise with respect to members of the
Revolutionary Command Council, who also granted themselves immunity
under the 1970 Constitution.
3 12
Article 15(c) of the Statute expressly denies immunity with respect to
any of the crimes stipulated in Articles 11 to 14. This is consistent with
international law, which does not recognize the defense of immunity in
relation to international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.3 13 Such immunity, under international law, can at best
only be temporal and not substantive.
31 4
The repromulgated, amended law should remove any reference to the
1970 Provisional Constitution,3 15 so as to preclude Saddam Hussein and
members of the Revolutionary Command Council from resorting to immu-
nity arguments on the basis of the head-of-state immunity provided in this
constitution.
Article 17(d) of the Statute provides that "[t~he crimes stipulated in
Articles 11 to 14 shall not be subject to any statute of limitations," but the
crimes under Article 14 are subject to statutes of limitations under Iraqi
law. The proposed law should specifically eliminate statutes of limitations
from applying to civil cases in relation to crimes committed by the Ba'ath
regime as these would unjustly deprive numerous victims of access to repa-
rations or damages for harm they may have suffered under it.
3 1 6
309. See id. at 224.
310. See 1970 Constitution, supra note 136, at art. 40.
311. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. BeIg.), 2002
I.CJ. 121 (Feb. 14), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBE
frame.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) (declining to extend jurisdictional immunity to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo) [hereinafter Congo v. Belgium]. For a discus-
sion of heads of state immunity, see BASsIOUNI, supra note 40, at 71. See also Rome
Statute, supra note 152, at art. 27 (removing both substantive and temporal immunity
for crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction).
312. See 1970 Constitution, supra note 136, at art. 40 ("The President of the Revolu-
tionary Command Council, the Vice President, and the members enjoy full immunity.").
313. See IMT Agreement, supra note 97, at art. 7; ICTY Statute, supra note 278, at art.
7(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 278, at art. 6(2); Congo v. Belgium, supra note 311; Prose-
cutor v. Taylor, No. SCSL-03-01-I-059 (Special Ct. Sierra Leone May 31, 2004) (denying
immunity to Charles Taylor, former President of the Republic of Liberia), available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/taylor-decisions.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005). Kathleen Day &
Pascale Bonnefoy, Pinochet Loses Immunity in Chile; Ruling May Lead to Human Rights
Trials, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2004, at A14; Larry Rother, Court Upholds Pinochet Indict-
ment, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 2005, at A6.
314. Id.
315. See 1970 Constitution, supra note 136.
316. See generally Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 53, Annex, at 214, U.N. Doc. A/
40/53 (1985) (stating that victims of abuse of power should be "entitled to access to the
Cornell International Law Journal
In civil legal systems, civil cases for damages arising out of a particular
crime are, to a large extent, determined by the criminal trial, because the
latter establishes the facts upon which damages are awarded in criminal
cases. 3 17 This is why in criminal cases, the rights of the victims are to be
protected at the trial level by the prosecutor or by private counsels repre-
senting the victims and known as partie civile. 31 8
Reference should be made in the proposed statute and in the proposed
explanatory memorandum that jus cogens principles of international law
prohibit statutes of limitations for certain international crimes,3 19 but this
would not apply to crimes listed in Article 14, which are domestic crimes.
VI. Issues Pertaining to Procedure and Evidence
A. Introduction
It is clear from reading the Statute that its drafters were not familiar
with the 1971 Criminal Procedure Law 3 20 and the inquisitorial system
upon which it is based. This is evident in the confusion created by the
provisions of the Statute in connection with the roles of the investigative
judge and the prosecutor and the application of certain due process rights
at different stages of the proceedings.
In an inquisitorial system, an investigative judge independently inves-
tigates the facts, including by examining suspects, victims, and witnesses,
collects all evidence prior to trial, and makes findings of fact. The findings
made by the investigative judge are conclusive and are only reopened at the
trial at the trial judge's discretion. This is quite different from the
Anglo-Saxon adversary-accusatorial system, where, in addition to issuing
indictments and presenting cases before the courts, the role of the prosecu-
tor includes many of the functions performed by an investigative judge
mechanisms of justice and to prompt redress, as provided for by national legislation, for
the harm that they have suffered").
317. See International Protection of Victims, in 7 NOUVELLES ETUDES PtNALES 49 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988).
318. In all Romanist-Civilist legal systems, the victim of a crime is entitled to be rep-
resented at the criminal trial in order to make sure that the record is made as to the
victim's basis for a civil claim. The latter must follow the criminal case, and the findings
of facts in the criminal case are conclusive in the civil case. In other words, the criminal
case controls the civil case as to the findings of fact. The criminal case's judges will then
determine whether these facts are sufficient for a civil claim. Facts established in a
criminal case will also determine the outcome of the damages. An acquittal, therefore,
may nonetheless result in civil recovery. The common law is different, as the criminal
and civil cases arising out of the same facts are independent of one another. See id.
319. See The UN Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp.
No. 18, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969). Moreover, the Genocide Convention, supra
note 267, and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 145, both of which were
acceded to by Iraq, remove statutes of limitations for these crimes. See also Christine
Van Den Wyngaert, War Crimes, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity-Are States Tak-
ing National Prosecutions Seriously?, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw: ENFORCEMENT,
supra note 93, at 227-38 (discussing, among other things, the nonapplicability of statu-
tory limitations to crimes against humanity).
320. Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 194.
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under an inquisitorial system. The indictment procedure does not exist in
Iraqi law. The investigative judge, upon being satisfied by the evidence
that a crime has been committed, "refers" (ihala) a case to trial.
B. Investigative Judges
As stated above, the Iraqi legal system is not an adversary-accusatorial
system-it is an inquisitorial one, modeled after the French legal system.
Iraqi criminal laws and procedure are based on Egyptian law,32 1 which is
also based on the French legal system. Under that system, an investigative
judge gathers the evidence and prepares the case for submission to trial.3 22
The Statute is based in part on the American adversary-accusatorial sys-
tem, which does not include investigative judges. Several of the Statute's
provisions demonstrate the confusion of its drafters regarding the role of
investigative judges and of prosecutors in gathering evidence and at the
trial under Iraqi law.3 23 Moreover, the procedures fail to understand the
respective roles of investigative judges and prosecutors. This can only pro-
duce more confusion in respect to the role of investigative judges and pros-
ecutors. It should be noted that the Iraqi judges, investigative judges, and
prosecutors have addressed some of the problems discussed herein and
have resolved them internally. But a de facto solution is not a substitution
for a legislative solution because what is controlling is the text of the Stat-
ute and not the de facto corrections that occurred. These corrections, how-
ever, could be relied upon in the repromulgated, amended law.
Article 7(c) of the Statute provides that "up to twenty" permanent tri-
bunal investigating judges may be appointed, and Article 7(j) of the Statute
provides that each such judge "shall act independently as a separate organ"
of the IST and shall not "seek or receive instructions" from any source
whatsoever. This structure, whereby up to twenty judges may be acting
independently and without any coordination, raises concerns in light of
the fact that several cases that may share the same or similar relevant facts
or that may involve more than one perpetrator could be handled by more
than one tribunal investigative judge, leading to conflicting facts or find-
321. QANUN AL-UQUBAT [EGYPTIAN PENAL LAw], Law No. 58 for the Year 1957; QANUN
AL-IJRAAT AL-JENA'EIA [EGYPTIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW], Law No. 50 for the Year 1950.
322. See Mirjan Damaska, Structures of Authority in Comparative Criminal Procedure,
84 YALE LJ. 539 (1975); Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two
Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973); Wil-
liam T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Difficul-
ties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation. 17 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1
(1992); John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth"
and Reality, 87 YALE LJ. 1549 (1978); Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, Comment
on Continental Criminal Procedure, 8 YALE L.J. 1570 (1978).
323. Compare THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL art. 7(h)-(j) (detailing the
powers and independence of the investigative judges, including that they "shall not
receive instructions from any Governmental Department, or from any other source")
with art. 8(b), (h) (giving prosecutors "the right to be involved in the investigative stages
of a case," yet also ensuring that the prosecutor shall also not seek or receive instructions
from any governmental department or from any other source). This overlap raises the
question of how prosecutors can carry out their function without infringing on investi-
gative judges' autonomy.
Cornell International Law Journal
ings.324 Furthermore, such an arrangement may also lead the IST to issue
inconsistent or conflicting judgments. Accordingly, it would be advisable
for the repromulgated, amended law to provide one investigative judge
appointed by a Judicial Council with a number of deputies who would be
answerable to the investigative judge. This would avoid conflicting fact
finding by separate investigative judges. 325 A single investigative judge
would be tantamount to a prosecutor general in other legal systems, who
supervises investigators, integrates their outcomes, sets up policies for his
office, selects personnel, establishes priorities, determines the sequences
of cases, consolidates evidence to be presented, and determines when and
how it is presented. This has already occurred de facto as a chief investiga-
tive judge has been appointed. However, a specific provision in the
repromulgated, amended law would clarify this situation. 326
C. Prosecutors
The role of prosecutors in Iraqi criminal procedure is different from
that of the investigative judge. This is quite different from what prosecu-
tors do in the adversary-accusatorial system. In the Iraqi legal system,
prosecutors do not gather evidence, as this is the province of investigative
judges. Prosecutors may only investigate and gather evidence before the
case is referred to the investigative judge. It is the latter who constitutes
the dossier of evidence, to be presented at the trial by a prosecutor. The
prosecutor presents the evidence at the trial and calls the witnesses to con-
firm this testimony. There is no right of confrontation or cross-examina-
tion at the trial. The presiding judge asks the questions presented by the
defense but is under no obligation to do so. Abuse of judicial discretion is
reviewable on appeal. While the Statute provides for the appointment of
prosecutors in the Prosecutions Department, it does not articulate their
specific roles or parameters. This is further complicated by the fact that
the 1971 Criminal Procedure Law does not specify a specific pretrial inves-
tigative role for the prosecutor.
The prosecutor also acts during the trial to guarantee the proper proce-
dure of the proceeding and to represent the rights of others, such as vic-
tims, who may be affected by the proceedings. However, Article 17 of the
Statute, which refers to various Iraqi laws, does not refer to the 1979 Law
of Prosecutors 327 as being applicable to the IST. Thus the role of the prose-
cutor in the IST is uncertain, unless it is deemed subject to the 1979 Law of
324. It appears that some time after the televised, so-called arraignment of Saddam on
July 1, 2004, a chief investigative judge was appointed. It is not publicly known who
appointed him or what authority he can exercise over other investigative judges who,
under IST Statute Article 7(1), are presumably independent of any hierarchical
authority.
325. This approach would be consistent with the Criminal Procedure Law of 1971,
supra note 194, under which investigative judges are free of hierarchical control over
findings of fact.
326. It has now been agreed upon internally that a chief investigative judge oversees
all investigations as suggested herein before a case is remanded to trial.
327. Law of Prosecutors, supra note 237.
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Prosecutors and the 1971 Criminal Procedure Law. The difficulty here is
that the IST refers to prior Ba'ath regime laws in some instances but not in
others. These ambiguities should be resolved in the repromulgated,
amended law.
D. Procedural Rights in the Context of the Statute's Hybrid Nature
The competences of the investigative judge and the prosecutor are con-
tained in two different laws. For investigative judges, it is in the 1971
Criminal Procedure Law, and for prosecutors, it is in the 1979 Law of Pros-
ecutors. The latter expanded the powers of the prosecutor, creating over-
laps with the powers of the investigative judge. The reason for that was the
Ba'ath party's goal of giving the Executive Branch, acting through the Min-
ister of Justice and the Public Prosecutor, greater political influence. Never-
theless, primary competence for investigation and preparation of the
evidence to be presented against a person in criminal proceedings
remained with the investigative judge. The prosecutor can, however,
engage in a variety of investigative activities even before the matter is
referred to the investigative judge. Understandably, the intricate nature of
these overlapping competences may have led the drafters of the IST to make
certain procedural selections based on what they hoped would bring clar-
ity to the process.
The investigative judge's authority under the Criminal Procedure Law
of 1971 is stated in the section beginning with Article 51. Article 53(b)
specifies that an investigation taking place outside of Iraq is to be exclu-
sively conducted by the investigative judge, who would be appointed for
that purpose by the Minister of Justice. In the IST's context, this is relevant
in connection with securing evidence regarding violations committed in
Kuwait and Iran, since the IST's jurisdiction encompasses crimes commit-
ted in these territories by Iraqi nationals. Thus, if the evidence is not gath-
ered by the investigative judge in these two countries, the evidence
gathered by the prosecutorial authorities of both Kuwait and Iran cannot be
used before the IST or any other Iraqi criminal court. The Iraqi investiga-
tive judge would have to hear witnesses himself, and could not rely on
witness statements produced by the prosecutorial or judicial authorities of
these two governments. 328 The alternative is to establish treaties on
mutual legal assistance between Iraq and Kuwait, and Iraq and Iran, to
have evidence gathered by the respective national judicial authorities of
Kuwait and Iran, in accordance with the requirements of Iraqi criminal law
and procedure. 3 29 It should be noted that there is a treaty on judicial
328. To the best of this writer's knowledge, there has been no such gathering of evi-
dence by the designated chief investigative magistrate so far.
329. There is an Arab Convention on Judicial Cooperation adopted in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, which serves as a model. Moreover, the Council of Ministers of Justice of the
League of Arab States adopted the Draft Arab Model Legislation on international cooper-
ation in penal matters at their meeting in November 2004 in Cairo (prepared by a minis-
terial committee of experts chaired by this writer and known as the "Siracusa Model
Law," since it was prepared at the International Institute for Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences, Siracusa, Italy). See also European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Crimi-
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cooperation between Iraq and Kuwait. 3 30
Article 20 of the Statute provides the accused with a number of rights,
which are derived from international human rights law standards and
which in turn are derived from the adversarial-accusatorial system.3 3 1 The
drafters of the Statute failed to recognize that due to the different systemic
roles of investigative judges and prosecutors, the rights of the defendant
differ in the inquisitorial and adversary-accusatorial systems. 33 2 Some of
these rights cannot be engrafted from one system unto the other. For
example, in the inquisitorial system, the questioning of witnesses takes
place mostly before the investigative judge during the investigation stage
prior to trial. If the defense counsel wishes to direct any questions to a
witness, it can be done only through the investigative judge, who would
have the discretion 3 33 as to whether and in what form to pose the ques-
tions to the witness.33 4 Accordingly, the adversary-accusatorial system's
right of the accused to confront and cross-examine a witness3 3 5 cannot be
applied in the inquisitorial system.3 36 The philosophy is that the investiga-
tive judge represents justice and is neither a partisan in the proceedings
nor an umpire who referees the sparring of adversaries-the prosecution
and defense. Thus, the assumption is that the investigative judge will pur-
sue all questions concerning the truth of the matter without partiality, bias,
or prejudice. To ensure that, the 1971 Criminal Procedure Law 33 7 requires
the investigative judge to inform the parties concerned of his field investi-
gations, the hearing of witnesses, findings of certain evidence, and to allow
the defense to be present with counsel and to offer any evidence it wishes.
These procedural rights of the defense are the counterpart of those offered
nal Matters, ETS No. 30 (Apr. 20, 1959), reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
PROCEDURAL AND ENFORCEMENT MECIANIsMs 381 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d rev. ed.
1999).
330. However, its text is unavailable to the author. Kuwaiti sources in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs have confirmed its existence.
331. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 197, at arts. 9-15.
332. See Damaska, supra note 322, at 526-30.
333. The investigative judge is provided with significant discretion under the inquisi-
torial system as to how to administer investigations, including who may be allowed to
attend any hearings, Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 194, at para. 57, and how to
direct questions, id. at para. 64.
334. The defense counsel can also pose questions through the president of the court
at the trial stage and, like the investigative judge, the president would have the discretion
as to whether to direct the questions to a witness or not, and he can phrase those ques-
tions it in any way he deems fit. Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 178, arts. 56-71.
335. In the Anglo-Saxon adversarial-accusatorial system, witnesses are directly con-
fronted and cross-examined by the defense counsel. See. e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see
also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968) (confirming that a criminal
defendant's right to confront witnesses against him, as guaranteed by the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, includes the right to cross-examination).
336. Indeed, not only is the introduction of the rights of confrontation and cross-
examination unnecessary and contrary to established practice and procedure in Iraq,
but it also provides a politically motivated defense with an opportunity to intimidate and
badger witnesses and to turn the trial proceedings into an extremely contentious and
time-consuming farce.
337. See Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 194.
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in the adversary-accusatorial model. The fundamental difference between
the two systems is the adversary-accusatorial leaves the evidence gathering
process and its rebuttal to the prosecution and defense, while the rules of
evidence demarcate the lines between what is admissible and what is not,
and the judge sits as an impartial arbiter.
The repromulgated, amended law should recognize that the inquisito-
rial system generally, and the Iraqi legal system in particular, do provide
rights to the defense that are equivalent to the due process rights under the
adversary-accusatorial system, but that, in light of the differences between
the systems, such rights do not arise at the same stages of the proceedings
and cannot be applied in the same way. For example, at the trial, the
defense can ask the presiding judge to direct certain questions to a witness
or to admit expert reports and testimony by the defense, which contradict
those of the prosecution. Thus, questions to witnesses are made by the
presiding judge, and he may reformulate them. If the defense's questions
are not asked, or are not asked in the manner necessary to elicit certain
responses, the defense may raise that on appeal. Similarly, the defense
may raise on appeal the presiding judge's failure to respond to its proffer of
evidence if it is deemed prejudicial to the defense's case.
To the extent that it is determined that additional rights and protec-
tions are necessary, these should be included during the appropriate stages
of the proceedings, which is most likely to be at the investigation level and
before the investigative judge. To have partially changed the rules of proce-
dure and evidence in a way that is different, not to say contradictory to the
1971 Criminal Procedure Law, reinforces the perception of a process
rigged against the defendants, when, in part, the opposite is what was
intended. Paradoxically, now that those supporting the adver-
sary-accusatorial model have succeeded in introducing such rights as con-
frontation and cross-examination at trial, there will be no way to prevent
Saddam and the leaders of his regime to make the trial political and even
farcical. To curtail that right after having enunciated it will only add to the
charges of hypocrisy and rigged trials.
There are other problematic procedural and evidentiary issues raised
by the Statute that cannot be described in detail here, but suffice it to say
that they derive essentially from the misconceptions mentioned above. If
the Iraqi inquisitorial system is to be preserved, the 1971 Criminal Proce-
dure Law 338 should apply. If a new system is to be developed to be more
favorable to the accused, then it should be carefully explained in the offi-
cial explanatory memorandum to the repromulgated, amended law.
Conclusion
Post-conflict justice is needed in Iraq. The establishment of the IST
has been an important first step in the journey of post-conflict justice in
Iraq; however, the IST and the Statute are marked by certain flaws identi-
338. Id.
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fied above. This situation can be corrected by the repromulgation of an
amended law, accompanied by an explanatory memorandum. The
repromulgated, amended law should be drafted in the Arabic language by
jurists familiar with the Iraqi legal system and international criminal law
and should be based on existing Iraqi law and legal concepts.
Moreover, the repromulgated, amended law should go beyond merely
setting up a specialized tribunal, because this does not sufficiently advance
the goals of post-conflict justice identified above in Part I. For example,
there is no victim compensation scheme, nor a historic commission to
establish the truth. Individual trials such as those that will involve Saddam
and ten to twelve of his senior aides cannot be expected to record the his-
tory of the regime's crimes.33
9
A victim compensation scheme will create popular demand for justice
in Iraq. More importantly, in conjunction with a repromulgated, amended
law issued in accordance with the propositions made above, the victim
compensation scheme could restore the faith of the Iraqi people in the post-
conflict justice process and the future of the rule of law in Iraq. The victim
compensation scheme could also be tied in to a historic commission,
which would be an extremely valuable contribution to the strategies for
post-conflict justice in Iraq.
A historic commission is also necessary to advance a broad strategy of
post-conflict justice in Iraq. This commission should investigate and docu-
ment the political violence committed in Iraq between 1968 and 2003, and
would provide an objective, formal, and official account of such violence,
detailing specific violations of human rights and humanitarian law as well
as general patterns of repression. 340 The commission would complete its
work by issuing a final report providing a detailed account of past violence
and violations, and make a series of specific policy recommendations for
future prevention. A popular version of its work should be produced for
wide dissemination and use in the Iraqi educational system and the Arab
world. Both the commission's detailed and popular reports can serve as a
permanent reference for future generations.
In addition to the need for a repromulgated, amended law and for an
accompanying explanatory memorandum, there is a need for building the
Iraqi legal system's institutional capacity and sustainability. The Iraqi jus-
tice system does not have enough qualified personnel with necessary
expertise for handling cases involving a massive amount of evidence. In
addition, the Iraqi judicial system lacks adequate logistical capabilities and
infrastructure necessary for a specialized tribunal. To deal with the issue
of building institutional capacity and sustainability, significant interna-
tional assistance is required. This assistance, however, must be provided at
the request and under the direction of Iraqis, and should be complemen-
tary to and supportive of Iraqi efforts, rather than in the place of such
339. See LANDSMAN, supra note 100.
340. See generally HAYNER, supra note 45 (outlining the way in which historic truth
commissions can aid countries in confronting past atrocities).
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efforts. Investigations cannot be developed by U.S. prosecutors and investi-
gators and then handed over to Iraqi investigating judges.3 41 The RCLO,
which supports the IST, is conscious of this. Rather, the entire process of
the specialized tribunal should function in a manner that builds sus-
tainability and capacity within the Iraqi judiciary. While a process of this
type may be difficult and time-consuming, a more comprehensive, engaged
approach will significantly improve the IST's legitimacy and provide an
array of other benefits to Iraqi society.
Given the enormous task facing such a specialized tribunal, the impor-
tance of comprehensive and carefully planned training programs cannot be
underestimated. 342 Some of these programs have begun under the aegis of
the RCLO, but they must be continuous, and be provided separately for the
sitting judges, investigative judges, and prosecutors, as well as the clerical
staff. The separate training sessions should be topical, skill- and subject-
matter-specific, by persons who are familiar with the Iraqi legal system,
and conducted in Arabic. Better-trained legal professionals will signifi-
cantly improve the success of the specialized tribunal, and uniform parallel
training will enhance predictability, consistency, and coherence in the
practice. This will reduce the need for external, foreign consultants and
provide the foundation for a renewed professional judiciary in Iraq.
In the estimation of many, the success of the political transition in Iraq
rests on the success of a broad-based post-conflict justice strategy, as out-
lined above in Part 1.343 How the nation faces its violent past is, to many,
central to the determination of its future and to its domestic and interna-
tional legitimacy. However, it should be clearly understood that opposition
to such trials in the Arab world is widespread. The reasons are that this
region has witnessed many regime changes, many of which were bloody
and none of which resulted in anything resembling genuine post-conflict
justice. Obviously, this is not a justification, nor even a valid reason, but
popular wisdom seems to rebel against a new ex post facto practice, proba-
bly because it is viewed as an American idea. More significantly, however,
vox populi is that the United States, viewed as the promoter of such trials,
is delegitimized because of its own "crimes" in Iraq and in the region
exceed those committed by Saddam and his regime. Nowhere in the world
is this so strongly felt as it is in the Arab world, and probably nowhere in
the world is it as strongly felt as in Iraq.
Justice in Iraq is too great a historic opportunity to be missed. It
would be a tragic historic event if it were to fail for the reasons stated above.
This is why it is imperative to set the process back on track by enacting a
341. The IST investigative judges should be in a position to gather, process, and
organize the evidence in a manner consistent with Iraqi law, procedure and practice.
International assistance would be most useful, not only with respect to technical capa-
bilities, but also storage facilities, retrieval of evidence, computerization of documents,
training of administrators and technical personnel, securing testimony from a large
number of victims and witnesses, and providing witness protection.
342. The Regime Crimes Liaison Office ("RCLO"), to its credit, has been providing
such programs.
343. See supra Part I.
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repromulgated, amended law as described above, generating popular Iraqi
support for the trials, establishing a victim compensation scheme, and set-
ting up a historic commission whose work can serve as a component of
educating future generations. Such a comprehensive plan will also
enhance the judiciary's capacity, sustain the rule of law, and enhance
democracy.
The IST needs to be perfected, and those who support post-conflict
justice in Iraq should support the suggestions contained herein and any
other constructive ideas. Moreover, they should lend their moral support
to the courageous and dedicated men and women of the IST who have put
their lives at risk to affirm the rule of law in their troubled country.
Table of Iraqi Legal Authorities
The following laws relating to Iraq are listed in chronological order.
Where indicated, English versions of the laws are available. Otherwise the
laws are in Arabic, and copies are on file with the author.
I. Iraqi National Laws
A. Constitutions of Iraq
1. AL-QANUN AL-AsAsi AL-IRAQI [Iraqi Fundamental Law of 19251,
available at http://nahrain.com/d/doc/dtr1925a.html (Arabic
version) and http://www.geocities.com/dagtho/iraqiconst1925
0321.html (English version).
2. AL-T'ADIL AL-AwAL LIL QANUN AL-ASASI [First Amendment of the
Iraqi Fundamental Law], available at http://nahrain.com/d/doc/
dtr1925b.html (Arabic version).
3. AL-T'ADIL AL-THANI LW QANUN AL-ASASI [Second Amendment of
the Iraqi Fundamental Law], available at http://nahrain.com/d/
doc/dtr1925c.html (Arabic version).
4. AL-DUSTUR AL-MO'AKAT 1958 [Provisional Constitution of 1958],
available at http://nahrain.com/d/doc/dtr1958.html (Arabic
version).
5. AL-DuSTUR AL-MO'AKAT 1964 [Provisional Constitution of 19641,
available at http://nahrain.com/d/doc/dtr1964.html (Arabic
version).
6. AL-DUSTUR AL-MO'AKAT 1968 [Provisional Constitution of 1968],
available at http://nahrain.com/d/doc/dtr1968.html (Arabic
version).
7. AL-DUSTUR AL-MO'AKAT 1970 [Provisional Constitution of
19701, available at http://mallat.com/iraq%20const%201970.
htm (English version).
B. National Legislation of Iraq
1. Qanun al-Uqubat al-Askaria [Military Penal Law], Law No. 13,
1940 and its amendments.
2. Qanun Usul al-Muhakamat al-Askaria [Military Trials Procedural
Law], Law No. 44 of 1941.
3. Al-Qanun el-Madani [Civil Code], Law No. 40 of 1951.
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4. Qanun Majlis Kidyadat al-Thawra [The Revolutionary National
Command Council Statute] No. 25 of 1963; available at http://
nahrain.com/d/doc/dtrl 963.html.
5. Qanun al-Asleha [Weapons Law], Law No. 151 of 1968.
6. Qanun al-Khedma w'el-Takaoud el-Askary [Military Service
Law], Law No. 65 of 1969.
7. Qanun al-Ijra'at el-Madania [Civil Procedure Law], Law No. 83 of
1969.
8. Qanun al-Uqubat [Criminal Code], Law No. 111 of 1969 and its
amendments (English version on file with author).
9. Qanun Usul al-Muhakamat al-Jaza'ia [Criminal Procedure Law],
Law No. 23 of 1971.
10. Qanun Wezarat al-Ad'l [Ministry of Justice Law], Law No. 101 of
1977.
11. Qanun al-IdeA al-A'm [Law of Prosecutors], Law No. 159 of 1979.
12. Qanun al-Tanzim al-Qada'i [Judicial Organization Law], Law No.
160 of 1979.
C. Legislation of Occupied Iraq
LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANsI-
TIONAL PERIOD (TAL), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/arabic
government/TAL-arabic.html (Arabic version) and http://www.
cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html (English version).
D. Human Rights Instruments Signed or Acceded to by Iraq
1. The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field ("First Geneva
Convention"), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3144, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
2. The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea ("Second Geneva Convention"), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
3. The Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
("Third Geneva Convention"), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135
4. The Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War ("Fourth Geneva Convention"), Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Iraq acceded on February 14,
1956.
5. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(entered into force January 12, 1951). Iraq acceded on January
20, 1959.
6. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, March 7, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 352 (entered into
force January 4, 1969). Iraq signed on February 30, 1970.
7. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force January 3, 1976).
Iraq signed on January 3, 1976.
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8. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force on March 23, 1976). Iraq
signed on March 23, 1976.
9. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women,July 17, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1979) (entered into
force September 3, 1981). Iraq acceded on August 13, 1986.
10. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force September 2, 1990). Iraq acceded
on July 15, 1994.
